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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
GRAHAM AUSTIN,
Defendant/Petitioner.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DEVON KINNE,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 20060508-SC

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS,
Defendant/Petitioner.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' rulings in State v.
Halls, 2006 UT App 142, 134 P.3d 1160, State v. Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U, and State v.
Austin, 2006 UT App 184U (addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305 (Utah 2005),

applied to the court of appeals' consideration of Petitioners' appeals, and whether the court
of appeals erred in reviewing Petitioners' challenges to the reasonable doubt instruction for
plain error.
2.

Whether the instruction that the State's evidence must "eliminate all reasonable

doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this Court's holding in Reyes.
"On certiorari, [this Court will] review the court of appeals' decision for correctness,
focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review." State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^f 12, 131 P.2d 202 (quoting
Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, t 8, 116 P.3d 290).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this appeal does not require interpretation of any constitutional
provision, statute, or rule.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
State v. Halls
On 7 September 2004, Halls was charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West
2004); one count of unlawful possession of imitation controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (West 2004); and one count of
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837a-5 (West 2004). R. 26-27.
A jury convicted Halls as charged. R.123. He was sentenced to the statutory terms.
R.125-26. He timely appealed. R.130.
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed his conviction in a published opinion. See
State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, 134 P.3d 1160 (addendum A). This Court granted
certiorari and consolidated the case with State v. Kinne and State v. Austin.
State v. Kinne
On 27 January 2004, Kinne was charged with one count each of receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41la-1316 (West 2004), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). R. 0417-14: 1-2. In another case,

1

All citations to the record refer to the record of the case being described. Thus,
within a section marked "State v. Halls" "R." refers to the Halls record.
3

arising out of an incident a month earlier, he was charged with burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). R. 0417-12:1-2. The trial
court consolidated the two cases for purposes of trial. R. 126: 148.2
A jury convicted Kinne as charged. R. 117-18. He was sentenced to one to fifteen
years on the receiving charge and six months in jail on the paraphernalia charge, to run
concurrently with the prison sentence imposed on the two charges arising from the earlier
incident and with credit for time served. Id. Kinne timely appealed. R. 124.
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v.
Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case with
State v. Halls and State v. Austin.
State v. Austin
On 27 January 2005, Austin was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Arm. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); and interfering with arrest,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-8-305 (West 2004). R. 111-12.
A jury convicted Austin of murder and interfering and of an amended charge of theft
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

2

To avoid unnecessary repetition, all cites in the State's brief to the pleadings files
in Kinne will refer only to case 0412-14.
4

404 (West 2004). R. 175-76,222:157. He was sentenced to five years to life for murder, one
to fifteen years for theft, and six months for interfering, to run consecutively. R. 177-181,
222:160, 172-173. He timely appealed. R. 182-83.
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v.
Austin, 2006 UT App 184U (addendum A). This Court granted certiorari and consolidated
the case with State v. Halls and State v. Kinne.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the issues on appeal do not turn on the facts of these defendants' crimes, the
State will abbreviate its recitation of the facts.
State v. Halls
On 1 March 2004, Halls's co-worker turned over to police some items of drug
paraphernalia that Halls had hidden under the passenger seat of the co-worker's truck: a glass
pipe, a bag with a white crystal substance, a black box containing a set of scales and a couple
of small baggies, and a larger empty bag. R.141:64, 80, 85,100. The baggies and the scales
tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 141:87. The white crystal substance was not
methamphetamine; Halls told police it was a "cutting agent" called "MSM." R. 151:81,101.
Halls admitted to police that the contraband was his, an admission he attempted to retract at
trial. R. 141:81-82, 101-02, 122, 131.

5

State v. Kinne
In December of 2003, Kinne decided to rob the home of the father of someone he
disliked. R. 126: 110. He burglarized the home while his friend stayed outside as a lookout.
R. 126: 109,112,114-15. Kinne apparently forced his way into the home with an ice ax and
ransacked the house. R. 126: 50, 54-56, 62. He removed a CD player, a speaker, and a
handgun. R. 126: 113, 116-17. When police found Kinne, he was also in possession of a
stolen Jeep and drug paraphernalia, including scales, a mirror, a syringe, baggies, and a spoon
handle. R. 126:65,71.
State v. Austin
On 9 May 2004, Austin was walking along a road when Walter Pratt drove by and
asked if he needed a ride. R. 221:72; 222:88. Austin stabbed Prattt multiple times, left him
to die in a ditch, and drove off in Pratt's camper. R. 221:76,111,222:90. Heather Mecham
and her four young children witnessed the murder. R. 221:72-77.
Police officers tracked down the camper. R. 221:149. It had blood all over it, from
the driver's seat and the dashboard to the handles and the windshield. R. 221: 220, 222-23.
The officers searched for and found Austin buried under dirt and juniper berries under a
juniper tree. R. 221.153, 166-68. Austin had a bloody four-inch knife in his back pocket.
R. 221:154. Austin asked if the guy he stabbed had died. When told that the victim was
dead, Austin said: "Oh, Lord, please forgive me. I've killed a man." R. 221:173.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L

The retroactivity of state interpretations of federal constitutional law is

governed by federal law. As a matter of federal law, this Court's decision in Reyes is
retroactive. However, state rules of preservation and standards of review apply even to
claims based on federal constitutional law. Under state rules of review, defendants'
Reyes claims are not properly before this Court.
Absent an intolerable injustice, not present here, this Court applies ordinary rules of
preservation to claims based on a post-trial change in the law. It has at least twice refused
to adjudicate claims based on an intervening change in the law when the litigants failed to
object at triaL This rule must apply with greater force where litigants not only fail to
preserve their objection, but actually invite the very error they claim on appeal. These
defendants approved the jury instructions they challenge on appeal. Accordingly, their
claims are not cognizable on appeal.
The change in law here does not present an exceptional circumstance justifying
review. At the time of their trials, defendants were on notice that the Robertson test was
vulnerable: Victor had already declared that the Constitution required no particular form of
reasonable doubt instruction or even any reasonable doubt instruction at all, the court of
appeals in Reyes /had declared the Robertson standard "constitutionally flawed," and this
Court had granted the State's petition for certiorari in Reyes, Moreover, defendants had an
incentive to approve a i?oZ>erteo/2-compliant instruction, since the instruction's purpose and

7

perceived effect was to raise the state's burden of proof. They thus suffered no manifest
injustice. If being convicted under a Robertson-compliant jury instruction constituted a
manifest injustice, most defendants convicted in Utah in the past quarter century could
complain that their convictions were manifestly unjust.
If this Court concludes that exceptional circumstances require entertaining the merits
of defendants' claims, two of the three prongs of the plain error standard apply. The second
prong, obviousness, cannot apply because application of this prong would always bar review,
since it can never have been obvious to the trial court that the law would change after trial.
But the litigant must show error and, even if the error is one normally deemed structural, he
must show harm.
2.

No Reyes error occurred here in any event. Reyes is best understood as

overruling the Robertson test, not the Robertson instruction. Robertson did not err by
mandating an unconstitutional instruction, but by mandating rules for reasonable doubt
instructions beyond what the United States Supreme Court has required. Therefore, the mere
fact that an obviation instruction was given here did not violate constitutional requirements.
But even if an obviation instruction is viewed as opening the door to constitutional
error, none resulted here. The prosecutors did not argue that a reasonable doubt must be
defined before it could serve as the basis for an acquittal. In addition, the jury instructions
read as a whole satisfactorily informed the jury of the State's burden to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
ALTHOUGH REYES APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO THESE
APPEALS, ANY ERROR WAS INVITED BY DEFENDANTS, WHO
APPROVED ROBER 7S6WINSTRUCTIONS AFTER THEY WERE ON
NOTICE THAT ROBERTSON WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DUBIOUS
The first issue identified in the grant of certiorari is two-fold: (1) whether this Court's
holding in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, applied to the court of appeals5
consideration of Petitioners' appeals; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing
Petitioners' challenges to the reasonable doubt instruction for plain error.
These issues arise because of a shift in the law between trial and appeal. At the time
of each of these three trials, reasonable doubt instructions in Utah were governed by State
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled by State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffif
22,30, 84 P.3d 841. In Robertson, this Court applied a tripartite test extrapolated from State
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-822 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and State v.
Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141. 1147-49 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring):
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more
weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable
doubt is not merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."
932 P.2d at 1232 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
9

On 15 January 2004, before any of these defendants went to trial, the Utah Court of
Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841 (Reyes I). In
Reyes, the State urged the court of appeals to abandon the Robertson test on the ground that
it misstated the constitutional standard for reasonable doubt instructions as declared in Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 US. 1 (1994). Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8, \ 20. A unanimous panel of the
court of appeals ruled that "we simply do not have the authority to overrule Robertson," but
agreed that Robertson could not be reconciled with Victor and described the tripartite
Robertson standard as "constitutionally flawed." Id. at ^ 21, 22.
On 26 May 2004, this Court granted the State's petition for certiorari. State v. Reyes,
94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004). None of these defendants had yet gone to trial.
The first to be tried was Kinne, on 16 September 2004. R. 126. In substantial
compliance with Robertson, the jury was instructed that "[t]he state must eliminate all
reasonable doubt." R. 104. Notwithstanding the court of appeals in Reyes /having branded
the Robertson test "constitutionally flawed," Kinne's trial counsel affirmatively approved the
instruction. R. 126: 148.
Halls was tried on 1 October 2004. R. 141. Again, the jury was instructed that "[t]he
state must eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 113. And again, despite Reyes I, defense
counsel affirmatively approved the instruction. R. 141: 151-53.
Austin was tried on 2 and 3 February 2005. R. 221,222. As in Kinne and Halls, the
jury was instructed that "[i]t is the burden of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt." R.
10

149. Austin's trial counsel objected to this language and asked the court to use the word
"obviate" instead of "eliminate." R. 222:128. The court declined. R. 222:128. Austin
otherwise approved the instructions. R. 222: 128-29.
On 7 June 2005, after these defendants were convicted, but before they filed their
opening briefs in the court of appeals, this Court overruled the Robertson three-part test in
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305 (addendum B). In particular, the Reyes court
found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "linguistically opaque and conceptually
suspect." 2005 UT 33, f 26. It concluded that, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate'
test would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently
defined, the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at \ 28.
Seizing upon this language, Halls, Kinne, and Austin all argued on appeal that their
convictions were infirm because they had been convicted under jury instructions written in
compliance with the abandoned Robertson test. See Austin, 2006 UT App 184U, f 1; Kinne,
2006 UT App 156U, % 2; Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 10. However, each of the defendants
was faced with the obstacle that he had failed to preserve the issue at trial.
Halls sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br. Aplt. at
13-14 {Halls). The State, citing State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), argued that the
exceptional circumstances doctrine did not apply. See Br. Aple. at 7-9. The court of appeals
reviewed the claim under the plain error doctrine. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 14. Without
discussing Lopez, it found "an exception to the preservation rule for exceptional

11

circumstances 'where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure
to have raised an issue at trial'" and declined to apply the invited error doctrine. Halls, 2006
UT App 142, f 13 n. 1. The court ruled that the reasonable doubt instruction "did not convey
the message that the State must only eliminate those doubts that are sufficiently defined;
neither did the State argue that the juror need articulate and eliminate specific doubts." Id.
at If 19. It held that the jury instructions taken as a whole correctly conveyed the principle
of reasonable doubt. Id.
Kinne also sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br. Aplt
at 11 -12 {Kinne). The State argued that any error was invited. See Br. of Aple. at 9-10. The
court of appeals reached the merits of Kinne5s reasonable doubt claim without invoking any
exception to the preservation rule. State v. Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U, Yi 2-3. It held that
the jury instructions correctly communicated the principle of reasonable doubt. Id. at ^f 3.
Austin, too, sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br.
Aplt. at 20 {Austin). The State argued that any error was invited. See Br. Aple. at 7-9. The
court of appeals reviewed the claim under the plain error doctrine. State v. Austin, 2006 UT
App 184U, U 1. It held that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the principle of
reasonable doubt. Id.
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As noted above, the first issue on certiorari, as framed by this Court, is two-fold.3 The
first sub-question is whether an opinion of this Court on a question of federal law—in this
case State v. Reyes—issued after a criminal trial but while the direct appeal is pending,
applies on appeal. This is a question of retroactivity.
The second sub-question is, assuming that the intervening precedent does apply to the
criminal appeal, what standard of review governs? This is a question of appellate procedure.
A.

As an intervening decision based on federal law, Reyes applies
retroactively to these pending cases.

1.

Federal retroactivity rules apply to federal claims.

The threshold inquiry in determining whether Reyes is entitled to retroactive
application is determining what law applies. The question of whether to apply the old rule
or the new one "is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law,
constitutional or otherwise." Jim Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534-35
(1991), superseded by statute as stated in Marks v. CDW Computer Centers, Inc., 901 F.
Supp. 1302, 1313 (N.D. 111. 1995); Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 862 P.2d 1348,
1351 (Utah 1993) (quoting Jim Beam). "The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl.2,
does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary

3

The precise wording of the first question on certiorari is as follows:

1.
Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305 (Utah
2005), applied to the court of appeals' consideration of Petitioners' appeals,
and whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing Petitioners' challenges to
the reasonable doubt instruction for plain error.
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approach to retroactivity under state law." Harper v. Virginia Dep }t of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 100 (1993). Thus, "[wjhatever freedom state courts may enjoy to limit the retroactive
operation of their own interpretations of state law cannot extend to their interpretations of
federal law." Id. (citations omitted); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902,
912 n.9 (Utah 1993) (recognizing this rule).
Reyes decided a question of federal constitutional law. Because Reyes challenged the
reasonable doubt instruction under the United States Constitution and raised no claim under
the Utah Constitution, this Court "restricted] [its] inquiry to the federal constitution." Reyes,
2005 UT 33, f 19. Therefore, federal retroactivity rules apply.
2,

A new rule of federal constitutional law applies to pending appeals.

"[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for
cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break5 with the past." Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied
retroactively to a state conviction pending on direct review at the time of the Batson
decision); see State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) (applying Batson retroactively).
To do otherwise, the Court declared, would violate "basic norms of constitutional
adjudication."
"controversies."

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. First, a court adjudicates only "cases" and
Unlike a legislature, a court does not "promulgate new rales of

constitutional criminal procedure on a broad basis." Id. Accordingly, it must "resolve all
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cases before [it] on direct review in light of [its] best understanding of governing
constitutional principles ..." Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,679
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). Second, "selective application of new rules
violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same." Id.
The Griffith Court abandoned the "clear break exception." Id. at 325,328. Under that
exception, "a new constitutional rule was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct
review, if the new rule explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved
a practice [the] Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding
practice that lower courts had uniformly approved." Id. (citation omitted).
Because Reyes applied a rule of federal constitutional law, and new rules of federal
constitutional law have retroactive effect, Reyes has retroactive effect. It applies to these
appeals.4

4

The state rule appears to be the same. This Court has held that when it has
established "a new rule on an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant whose direct
appeal was pending was entitled to the benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his
appeal." State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (citing State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274
(Utah 1980)), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1986).
However, changes in the law "expressly declared to be prospective in operation," State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406 n.7 (Utah 1994), such as when this Court articulates a "new
cautionary policy" under it supervisory powers, do not apply retroactively, even to pending
appeals. State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 353-55 (Utah 1996).
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B.

The invited error doctrine bars review of these claims.

That Reyes is entitled to retroactive effect does not mean that defendants are entitled
to pursue their reasonable doubt claims on appeal. Rules of review still apply. Under
applicable rules, defendants' claims are barred by the invited error doctrine.
1.

State preservation rules apply to federal claims.

Questions of preservation and standards of review are matters of state law, even when
the claim to be determined is grounded in federal law. This Court has long recognized that,
"in general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments,
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case
involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346). Similarly, in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105 (1973), the Supreme Court looked to whether the Indiana Supreme Court had regarded
Hess's "actions in the state courts as sufficient under state law to preserve his constitutional
arguments on appeal." Id. at 106 n.2.
This Court has examined at length the question of whether federal or state standards
of review apply to claims based on federal law. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,126667 (Utah 1993). It concluded that, "absent an express federal statement to the contrary, state
courts are not bound by federal standards when reviewing state trial court determinations of
federal constitutional issues . . . " Id. at 1267. Thus, "the standard of review is a question to
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be determined by the law of the forum performing the appellate review"—that is, the state.
Id. at 1266-67.
2.

State preservation rules bar review of invited errors.

In cases not involving intervening decisions, the rules of review are clear. Claims of
error fall into one of three categories based on how they were handled in the trial court:
preserved, forfeited, or—as in these cases—invited.
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order
to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ] 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551). A preserved issue will be reviewed on
appeal under the ordinary rules: the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate error and,
usually, prejudice. State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ^f 21. 5
An appellant may fail to object at trial. If so, his claim of error is considered waived
or, more properly, forfeited. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,733 (1993) ("Waiver
is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of
a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'")
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938)); State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, If 31,

5

In the case of non-constitutional trial error, the appellant must demonstrate prejudice
or harm. See, e.g., State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). In the case of
constitutional error, once the appellant has demonstrated error, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In the rare case of structural error, a showing of error
alone requires reversal. An erroneous beyond-reasonable-doubt instruction is structural
error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
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137 P.3d 716 ("While waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, . . .
'forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.'") (quoting United
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3rd Cir. 1995)),
The preservation rule has two exceptions. This Court has "consistently held that a
defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection
on appeal unless he is able to demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances."
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^ 13,131 P.3d 202 (citing State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, % 9,46 P.3d
230; Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)).
To establish plain error, the appellant must show "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). However, "the obviousness requirement poses no rigid and
insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989). An
appellate court may exercise its discretion "to dispense with the requirement of obviousness
so that justice can be done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or counsel
proves harmful in retrospect." Id. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the
court] to avoid injustice." Id.
The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined" and "applies primarily to rare
procedural anomalies." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
920, 926 (Utah App. 1991)). Courts employ this "safety device" sparingly, "reserving it for
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the most unusual circumstances, where . . . failure to consider an issue that was not properly
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson- Waggoner,
2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A defendant may also "assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve
the issue." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21 n.2,61 P.3d 1062. Although sometimes cast
as an exception to the preservation rule, see Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^f 4, ineffective assistance
differs from plain error and exceptional circumstances: the latter permit appellate review of
a claim of trial court error, while the former permits review of a claim of attorney error.6
The appellate court will decline to consider a claim if the appellant treats an
unpreserved claim of error as if it were preserved—that is, if he fails to argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
A litigant may go further than simply not preserving an error in the trial court; he may
invite it. "[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, [this Court has] declined to engage in even
plain error review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT
4,114,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111) (first set
of brackets added). " A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such instruction
would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement or act,

6

None of these defendants has claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for
approving an instruction requiring the state to eliminate all reasonable doubt.
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affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no obj ection to the jury instruction.'"
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If
54, 70 P.3d 111); see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742.
Consequently, "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice [or plain error], the
invited error rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App.1991).
Here, defendants at trial invited the error they complain of on appeal. Consequently,
unless the invited error doctrine is trumped by a change in the law, their appellate claim is
barred.
3.

Preservation rules generally apply to claims based on a change in
the law.

Defendants here claim that the invited error doctrine does not apply—and the
exceptional circumstances exception does—because the law changed after they approved the
jury instructions they now attack on appeal. Br. Halls at 8; Br. Kinne at 8-9; Br. Austin at
9-10.
Under this Court's precedent, the general rule is that ordinary rules of review apply
when an intervening decision applies retroactively to a "pipeline" case pending on appeal.
See State v. Benny Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994); State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 (Utah
1993). However, in at least one pipeline case, this Court has, to avert a manifest injustice,
reached the merits of an unpreserved claim based on a new rule. See State v. Haston, 846
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam).
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Olsen was the first case following the general rule. Olsen was convicted of
aggravated robbery. Olsen, 860 P.2d at 333. After his trial, this Court issued State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), which established state due process standards for the
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony.

On appeal, Olsen argued that

identification testimony was admitted at his trial in violation of Ramirez. This Court held
that "this claim was not properly preserved for appeal because defendant failed to object on
constitutional grounds when the trial court admitted the eyewitness identification evidence.55
Id. at 335.
Lopez is to the same effect. Benny Lopez was convicted of child sex abuse. Lopez,
886 P.2d at 1108. At trial, a photo array was admitted without objection. On appeal, after
Ramirez had been decided, Lopez relied on Ramirez to argue that the photo array was
impermissibly suggestive under state due process. Id. at 1113.
In addressing "whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal," this Court applied
ordinary preservation rules: "The general rule is that issues not raised at trial cannot be
argued for the first time on appeal, and this rule applies to constitutional questions." Id.
(citation omitted). It continued, "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the
first time on appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error' or 'exceptional
circumstances' exceptions exist." Id. Thus, this Court did not regard a change in the law
as an exceptional circumstance excusing Lopez's failure to preserve his Ramirez issue. The
Court also noted that it had "already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that
were not raised at trial." Id. (citing Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335).
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Olsen and Lopez are in line with many jurisdictions that apply a retroactive
intervening decision to a pipeline case only when appellants preserved their claims at trial.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Texas Dept. ofCriminalJustice, 300 F.3d 567,573-575 (5th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to reach unpreserved issue despite change in law); State v. Martinez, 896 A.2d 109,
166 n.3 (Conn. App. 2006) ("To allow the defendant to raise this issue for the first time on
appeal would produce a substantially inequitable result."); Corona v. State, 929 So.2d 588,
592-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (generic "confrontation" objection insufficient to preserve
Crawford claim); State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Iowa 1990) (defendant who
preserves error is entitled to benefit of change in law) (citing State v. McNabb, 241 N.W.2d
32, 33-34 (Iowa 1976)); Commonwealth v. Pidge, 509 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Mass. 1987)
("where an issue is properly preserved and pending on direct appeal, the defendant is entitled
to the benefit of a new rule of law announced after his trial"); People v. Hill, 648 N.E.2d 455,
458 (N.Y. 1995) ("where the issue has been properly preserved," intervening decision is
retroactive to pipeline cases); Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552, 555 (Penn. 1999)
(a "new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly
preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal"); Ellis County
State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 799 (Tex. 1994) (intervening decision applies to
pending case in which a party has preserved the error).7

7

Other jurisdictions take approaches more lenient to appellants. See, e.g., Martinez,
300 F.3d at 573-575 (reviewing approaches of Fourth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits);
United States v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir. 1998) (changes in the law will be
accorded retroactive effect under federal plain error review); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d
22

Haston represents the exception to this general rule. It predates Olsen and Lopez but
was not cited in them. Haston shot a man at close range during a drunken quarrel. Id. at
1277 n. 1. He was convicted of attempted depraved indifference murder. Id. at 1277. After
trial, this Court in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), held that Utah does not recognize
the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide. Id. The State argued that defendant
could not make a Vigil claim for the first time on certiorari. In a per curiam opinion, this
Court entertained the claim, reversed, and remanded for a new trial. Id.
Without referring to "exceptional circumstances" or citing any authority, it held that
failing to consider defendant's claim would result in a manifest injustice for two reasons.
First, Haston had raised the issue in a footnote in his brief before the court of appeals, as well
as in a petition for rehearing. Id. But more fundamentally, the Court feared that "defendant
may presently be incarcerated for a crime which is not recognized in Utah." Id. "Under such
circumstances," it wrote, "failure to consider defendant's assigned error merely because he
was tardy or inartful in raising the issue previously strikes us as manifestly unjust." Id. The
brief opinion does not discuss whether Haston invited any error in the trial court.8
610, 621-22 (Mich. App. 2005) (issue "'preserved' . . . by operation of law" when law
changes).
8

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996), cites State v. Gerard Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127 (Utah 1994), and State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993), in support of its assertion
that this Court has "employed the 'exceptional circumstances' rubric where a change in law
or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial." Id. at
10. Haston is discussed in text.
Gerard Lopez did not involve an attempt to reverse the trial court based on an
intervening change in the law. Police found cocaine in Gerard Lopez's vehicle during an
inventory search. Id. at 1129. The trial court granted Lopez's motion to suppress under the
23

Plotting Olsen, Lopez, and Haston yields the following rule: a retroactive, intervening
change in the law does not, without more, abrogate ordinary preservation rules, but
exceptional circumstances may justify review where (1) defendant acted promptly in
asserting the claim, and (2) failure to apply the new rule would work a manifest injustice on
the order of punishing someone for non-criminal act.
This rule is rational. At trial, a litigant who feels aggrieved by a rule may challenge
it or he may forego the challenge. What he may not do is forego the challenge at trial and
on appeal enjoy the benefits of having mounted the challenge. Had Austin, Kinne, or Halls
believed that a Robertson instruction prejudiced them at trial, they could have objected. Had
they done so, an appellate court could, under Lopez, have reached the merits of the claims
and applied Reyes. But defendants were not entitled both to enjoy the benefits of the
Robertson test at trial and to attack it on appeal.
The court of appeals has taken a scattershot approach in applying preservation rules
to claims based on new rules. In State v. Duanyai, 2004 UT App 349U, cert, denied, 109

pretext doctrine. Id. The court of appeals reversed, but declined the State's invitation to
abandon the pretext doctrine. Id. This Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari. Id.
For the first time on certiorari Lopez argued that this Court should adopt the pretext
doctrine under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1134 n.2. The State argued that this argument
had been waived. This Court ruled that "exceptional circumstances" justified entertaining
this argument on certiorari. Id. (citations omitted). It reasoned that because at the time of
the suppression hearing the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment
law as interpreted by the court of appeals, defendant had no reason to argue that the doctrine
should be adopted under the state constitution. Id.
Lopez stands for the unremarkable proposition that a litigant who prevails in the trial
court need not preserve an alternative ground in the trial court in order to argue it on appeal.
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P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), the court of appeals correctly applied ordinary rules of review while
properly giving retroactive application to an intervening decision of the United States
Supreme Court. It (1) ruled that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) applied
retroactively to the case under review; (2) noted that Duanyai had not preserved his crossexamination claim; and (3) reviewed the claim under plain error. Duanyai, 2004 UT App
349U,ffif1-3 (unnumbered). It found no error. Id.
In Halls, one of the cases at bar, Halls attacked on appeal the very reasonable doubt
instruction he had expressly approved at trial, thus inviting any error. Halls, 2006 UT App
142, % 13 n. 1. The court of appeals stated, "Utah law has not addressed whether the invited
error doctrine applies when there has been a change of settled law."

Id. Although

technically true, this statement is misleading, since in Olsen and Lopez this Court held that
mere failure to object—a less egregious transgression than inviting the error—precluded
appellate review, notwithstanding an intervening change in law. See Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335;
Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. The court of appeals then held that a change in law was an
exceptional circumstance, permitting plain error review. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ^} 13 n.l
(citing United States v. West Indies Transp.y Inc., Ill F.3d 299,305 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also
State v. Miranda, 22 P.3d 506, 507 n.l (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) ("the doctrine of invited error
does not apply when the error is based on a change in the law after the defendant's trial").
The court of appeals found no error, id. at % 19, and thus did not reach the question of how
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a claim of error based on a post-trial change in the law could ever have been obvious to the
trial court.9
In Kinne, another of the cases on review here, the court of appeals simply held the
reasonable doubt instruction correct without discussing a standard of review or explaining
why review was not precluded by defendant's having invited the error. See Kinne, 2006 UT
Appl56U,1f3.
In Austin, the third case on review here, the court of appeals applied the plain error
standard without discussing why the invited error doctrine did not bar review or how plain
error's obviousness prong could apply to a claim based on a change in the law. See Austin,
2006UTAppl84U,tl.
In State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327,143 P.3d 302,10 the court of appeals applied
the invited error rule. Wareham involved a Reyes reasonable-doubt-instruction issue. At
trial, Wareham "not only affirmatively approved of the use of the word obviate, but actually
insisted that it be inserted into the instructions." Id. at 116. On appeal, he relied on Reyes
to attack the instructions. Id. at f 14. The court of appeals "decline[d] to address this issue
as invited error." Id. at \ 16. This is the only one of the Reyes challenges where the court
of appeals acknowledged that the defendant had invited the error he complained of on appeal.
9

The federal rule on plain error is that "where the law at the time of trial was settled
and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is enough that an error be 'plain' at
the time of appellate consideration." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997).
However, as noted above, questions regarding preservation and standards of review are
matters of state law.
10

Cross-petitions for certiorari are pending in Wareham.
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In State v. Phipps, 2006 UT App 372U, the court of appeals reverted to its earlier
stance, refusing to invoke invited error and ruling instead that the exceptional circumstances
concept "maybe employed 'where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored
the failure to have raised an issue at trial...'" Id. at ^| 2 n. 1 (quoting State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d
5,10 (Utah App. 1996)). See also State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228,232 (Utah App. 1991)
(ruling that a change in law constitutes an exceptional circumstance, since under existing law
"it would have been futile to raise the issue").
In none of the foregoing cases did the court of appeals cite Benny Lopez, 886 P.2d
1105, this Court's clearest treatment of the question of the interplay between preservation
rules and retroactive changes in the law.
In sum, when faced with a retroactive change in the law, this Court should follow the
rule of Olsen, Lopez, and Haston: an intervening, retroactive change in the law does not
constitute an exceptional circumstance abrogating ordinary rules of preservation except
where necessary to avert a manifest injustice. Part of the manifest injustice inquiry is
considering whether the appellant acted reasonably in attempting to bring the claim before
a court promptly. Neither Olsen, Lopez, nor Haston involved invited error, although it is
instructive that part of this Court's rationale for reaching Haston's claim of error was that he
had acted reasonably in pressing his Vigil claim.
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4.

No "exceptional circumstances" exist here because these
defendants were on notice that Robertson was "constitutionally
flawed" and face no manifest injustice.

Defendants here seek to avoid the invited error doctrine on the ground that the law
changed after they approved the instructions they now assail on appeal. Br. Halls at 8; Br.
Kinne at 8-9; Br. Austin at 9-10. As demonstrated above, a change in the law without more
will not excuse an appellant from compliance with the ordinary rules of preservation and
appellate review except to avert a serious manifest injustice, and then only if the appellant
himself has acted with diligence. Moreover, invited error appears to trump even exceptional
circumstances.
These defendants invited any error by approving at trial the instructions they now
challenge on appeal. This Court has never suggested that the safety device of exceptional
circumstances could be invoked to excuse invited error. That would permit a party to "take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing
the error.5" Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, H 9 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109
(Utah 1996) (in turn quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220) (internal quotation omitted)). See
also Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, f 16 (declining to address a claim based on a change of
law on the ground that any error was invited).
However, even if in an appropriate case this Court were inclined to carve out a
change-of-law exception to the invited error doctrine, this is not the case. Application of
settled rules of review here will not "result[] in manifest injustice." Nelson- Waggoner, 2004
UT 29,1j 23.
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The primary rationale for reviewing an issue premised on a change in the law is that
a defendant should not be held to have forfeited a claim "by failing to raise it before the
theory on which his argument is premised has been sufficiently developed to put him on
notice that the issue is a live issue." Commonwealth v. Bowler, 553 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Mass.
1990) (holding that defendant was not entitled to unpreserved claim based on new rule where
rule was reasonably foreseeable). "Counsel," it is said, "need not be 'clairvoyant'" Id. Here,
however, "clairvoyance of counsel was not required." Id. Although this Court had not yet
overruled Robertson, the court of appeals' Reyes opinion "put the defendants] fairly on
notice" that challenging the constitutionality of the Robertson test "was a reasonably arguable
proposition." Id.
The confluence of three factors put these defendants on notice that, at the time of their
trials, the Robertson test was precarious. First, even a cursory reading of Victor suggests that
any formal requirements for reasonable doubt instructions are constitutionally suspect. See
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. Second, even if that fact was not obvious from Victor itself, the^eourt
of appeals had, before these defendants' trials, unanimously pronounced the Robertson threepart test "constitutionally flawed" under Victor. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, % 22, 84
P.3d 841. Finally, this Court had granted the State's petition for certiorari in Reyes, a clue
that this Court was at least open to the possibility of overruling Robertson. See State v.
Reyes, 94 P.3d 929 (2004).
Defendants were not blind-sided. On the contrary, they "had reasonable grounds for
declining to propose—and if necessary, stating an objection to—the . . . instruction that
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instead they asked the court to give." Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 677 (11th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to "carve out an exception to the invited error rule"). Rather than approving the
reasonable doubt instruction, they could have "in good faith asserted an objection to it with
an eye toward arguing for a more favorable standard before this Court..." Id.
Of course, defendants had little reason to object to the Robertson instruction. The
instruction is generally regarded as defense-favorable. Although this Court rejected the
Robertson test at least in part because it was able to conceive of a circumstance in which the
Robertson test might "diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict," the Court also
acknowledged that this tendency was "contrary to [the standard's] purpose." Reyes, 2005 UT
33, *! 27. Indeed, the Robertson standard has traditionally been seen as a defense-favorable
rule. Certainly the rule's originator, Justice Stewart, conceived it that way. See Johnson,
11A P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring, with two judges concurring) (arguing that a
reasonable doubt instruction violating the second factor of what would become the Robertson
test permitted conviction on "something less than evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt"); Ireland, 113 P.2d at 13 82 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that third factor of what
would become the Robertson test was necessary because a contrary instruction would
"diminish the prosecution's burden of proof').
Accordingly, convicting defendants under a Robertson-compliant instruction did not
result in manifest injustice here. Indeed, since Justice Stewart garnered a third vote in
Johnson in 1989, defendants in Utah have been convicted under instructions stating that the
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State must obviate all reasonable doubt. It is inconceivable that all these convictions are
manifestly unjust.
Because this case poses no danger of manifest injustice, this Court should invoke the
invited error doctrine and leave for another day the question of whether an unforeseeable,
defense-favorable change in the law can ever constitute an exceptional circumstance
relieving a litigant from the consequences of having invited the error he claims on appeal.
5*

Any review of defendants' claims should be conducted under the
first and third prongs of the plain error standard.

Should this Court conclude that exceptional circumstances require entertaining the
merits of defendants' claims, the first and third prongs of the plain error standard—error and
harm—should apply. The second cannot.
The second prong of the plain error standard is that "the error should have been
obvious to the trial court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. This prong of the plain error test can
never be met where trial proceedings are reviewed under an opinion issued after trial,
because it will never have been obvious to the trial court that its actions would violate a
future precedent. But to apply the obviousness prong in appeals applying retroactive
precedents would make the obviousness requirement a "rigid and insurmountable barrier to
review." Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 n.8. And the exceptional circumstances exception applies
only in cases, like Haston, where application of the ordinary preservation rules would work
a grave and manifest injustice. In that circumstance, review is required even where the
manifest injustice would not have been obvious to the trial court.
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The remaining two factors—error and harm—must be shown, however. This Court
in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, struggled with whether to require a showing of
harm in a circumstance, such as this, where under ordinary circumstances the error would be
structural. It reviewed a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction under the plain error
standard, because Cruz had not preserved the error at trial (and apparently had not invited it).
Id. at Tf 16. The Cruz court noted that plain error requires a showing of harm. Id. at ^f 16.
The Court also noted, that "[ejrroneous reasonable doubt instructions . . . give rise to
structural errors." Id. at \ 17 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
The Court went on to note that the United States Supreme Court has held that "a
defendant claiming constitutional error who did not object at trial may only argue plain error
or ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and thus must prove prejudice, even if the
constitutional error claimed on appeal is structural in nature." Id. at f 18 (citing United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464-67
(1997)). However, the Cruz court did not decide the issue because it found no error.
If this Court reaches this issue, it should follow the lead of the Supreme Court and
require a showing of harm as well as error. The exceptional circumstances doctrine is a
"safety device" reserved "for the most unusual circumstances, where . . . failure to consider
an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest
injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23. No claim that an action of the trial court
has worked a manifest injustice can be taken seriously unless a defendant demonstrates a
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reasonable likelihood that, absent the challenged action, a different result would have
obtained at trial.
Thus, in circumstances where a preserved challenge to an erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction would require reversal as structural error, a challenge brought under the plain
error standard should result in reversal only where the instruction was so flawed and the
State's case so equivocal that defendant would not have been convicted under a correct
instruction. Defendants here do not assert harm from the reasonable doubt instruction.
IL
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE STATE MUST "ELIMINATE
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT," THOUGH NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED, WAS NOT ERRONEOUS
The second question presented on certiorari is whether the instruction that the State's
evidence must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this
Court's holding in Reyes.
Jury instructions. Each of the defendants' cases was tried by the same district judge,
who gave the following reasonable doubt instruction in the Halls and Kinne trials:
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial.
If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate all reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a
doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act
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conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.
R. 113 (Halls) (addendum C); R. 104 (Kinne) (addendum D). The reasonable doubt
instruction given in Austin was materially identical:
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial.
If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
should be acquitted.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty.
It is the burden of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt. Reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or
wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough
proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.
R. 149 (Austin) (addendum E). In addition, each of the three juries was instructed as follows
in the stock portion of the elements instruction:
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows: . . . If you
believe that the state has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any
one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
not guilty.
R. 107-08 (Halls) (addendum C); R. 99-100 (Kinne) (addendum D); R. 143-44 (Austin)
(addendum E).
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Analysis. Defendants claim that constitutional standards for reasonable doubt
instructions "cannot be met as long as the phrase 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' is included
in the instruction." Br. Halls at 22; Br. Kinne at 24; Br. Austin at 22.
Preliminarily, defendants criticize the court of appeals for stating that it considered
"the 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' jury instruction to be less troublesome than the Reyes
'obviate all reasonable doubt' instruction." Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 15; see Br. Halls at
19-21; Br. Kinne at 21-23; Br. Austin at 19-21. The State agrees that "eliminate all
reasonable doubt/' the phrase employed in these jury instructions, and "obviate all reasonable
doubt," the phrase required by Robertson, are functional equivalents.
Defendants' fundamental contention is that constitutional standards for reasonable
doubt instructions "cannot be met as long as the phrase 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' is
included in the instruction. Br. Halls at 22; Br. Kinne at 24; Br. Austin at 22. This claim
reads too much into Reyes.
This Court in Reyes found the '"obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "[ijnsightful
and important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33,
126:

The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification
of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence.
This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to
the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the
doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however,
condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to
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articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that
the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis
to acquit.
Id. at \ 27. The Court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate5 test would
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at ^ 28.
The Court's reservations about the obviation instruction appear to be fundamentally
theoretical. Its analysis on this point is supported by a law review article. See id. atfflf26-28
(citing Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1165 (2003)).n The article is an historical and jurisprudential critique of the reasonable
doubt standard as applied.
Professor Sheppard assails "the practice of describing reasonable doubts as articulable
doubts." Id. at 1207. He faults jury instructions that define a reasonable doubt as one "for
which a reason may be assigned," or as "a serious, sensible doubt, such as you could give a
good reason for." Id. at 1210. But he goes further, suggesting that every reasonable doubt
instruction suffers from this infirmity: "Although it may be that every reasonable doubt
instruction implies a requirement like articulability, the idea that a juror must be able to state
the doubt on which to acquit the defendant goes very far afield from our view of the
prosecution having to prove its case to the juror's judgment of certainty." Id. at 1206.

11

This article has been cited in one other judicial opinion. See State v. Garcia, 92
P.3d41, 45 (N.M. App. 2004), reversed in relevant part, 116 P.3d 72 (N.M. 2005).
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As the foregoing quotation implies, Sheppard questions the reasonable doubt standard.
"In the realms of both law and popular usage," he declares, "a strong linkage continues
between reason and identification, such that a reasonable doubt must be identifiable,
quantifiable, and at the least articulable." Id. at 1223. This is what he calls "the problem of
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1225. Consequently, he writes, "the current standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt has deep normative and descriptive frailties." Id. at 1244. Victor,
he argues, "str[uck] even more deeply against the requirement ofjuror certainty," id. at 1218,
which Sheppard prefers. See id. at 1206 (quoted above), 1217 ("there is no indication that
the Court considered the idea of reasonable doubt as a lesser standard than the standard of
certainty that was once offered to the defendants in American courts"). He writes that the
reasonable doubt instruction is "a limitation on the discretion of the juror," since instructed
jurors "are not to act independently but only as the law would have them act in their role."
Id. at 1240. "This particular limit on discretion," he declares, "is one that might be
fundamentally immoral." Id.
Professor Sheppard would undoubtedly object to a Robertson instruction. But this
Court did not adopt Professor Sheppard5 s views in Reyes. Reyes is best understood as having
overruled, not the Robertson instruction, but the Robertson test. Indeed, that is how
subsequent decisions of this Court have read Reyes. Reyes was argued the same day as two
other cases, State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 21, 122 P.3d 543, and State v. Weaver, 2005 UT
49, f 7, 122 P.3d 566. Neither applies Sheppard's analysis.
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In Cruz, this Court noted that, "pursuant to our opinion in Reyes, the Robertson test
is no longer in force." Id. at ^f 21. Cruz never suggests that the instruction given in
Robertson was flawed. Indeed, the instructions approved in Cruz instructed the jury at some
length on how to articulate a reasonable doubt. One instruction was entitled "How to
Evaluate Reasonable Doubt":
Instruction seventeen, entitled "What Is a Reasonable Doubt," read:
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense
rather than speculation, supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is
the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate
to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as
would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and
impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must arise from
the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.
Finally, instruction eighteen, entitled "How to Evaluate Doubt," read:
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible
doubt exists, you must determine whether such doubt is
reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law
does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or
conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt.
That is what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."
Id. at % 11. This instruction was part of a set of instructions that this Court held "provided
a clear and accurate definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 22.
Similarly, in Weaver, this Court stated that in Reyes "we overruled the Robertson test
mandating that a reasonable doubt instruction specifically require the state to 'obviate all
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reasonable doubt.'" 2005 UT 49, | 7 (citations omitted). Nothing in the Weaver opinion
casts doubt on the Robertson instruction.
Cruz and Weaver make clear that the constitutional error lay in the Robertson test, not
the Robertson instruction.
Robertson went wrong not by requiring an unconstitutional instruction, but by
requiring under the aegis of the Constitution what the Constitution does not require. States
are not free to "interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than [the
United States Supreme Court's] own federal constitutional precedents provide." Arkansas
v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769,772 (2001) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)); see also
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,326 (1994) (reversing the California Supreme Court's
holding that a defendant's Miranda rights are triggered when he becomes the focus of an
officer's undisclosed suspicions); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,463
n.6 (1981) (a state court "is not free to impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal
constitutional law than this Court has imposed"). In particular, "a State may not impose ..
. greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when [the United States
Supreme Court] specifically refrains from imposing them." Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (1975).
Robertson violated this principle. In Victor, the Supreme Court specifically refrained
from imposing any formal requirements on reasonable doubt instructions: "so long as the
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used
in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. Yet
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Robertson required that a particular form ofwords—"obviate all reasonable doubt"—be used
in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof.
In Reyes, this Court deftly sidestepped this pitfall. It suggested a reasonable doubt
instruction for use in Utah courts, but only as a matter of "guidance," not constitutional
mandate. Id. at ff 33,35,37. It cautioned that while the instruction was a "safe harbor," any
reasonable doubt instruction that adequately informs the jury of the State's burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would be found constitutional. Id. at \ 38. Indeed, the Court
expressly recognized that "defining 'beyond a reasonable doubt' is a process of evolution and
adaptation, and in the future new definitions may emerge." Id. In Reyes, the Court thus
navigated between Victor's prohibition on formal requirements (including any requirement
that the standard be defined at all) and its own felt need to "resolve[] any uncertainty" on the
question of reasonable doubt instructions. Id.
In any event, the instructions at issue here did not lower the state's burden of proof,
even under the strictest analysis that could be attributed to the Reyes opinion. Reyes
indicated that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden of proof only
to the extent that it "would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are
sufficiently defined . . ." Id. As the court of appeals observed in Halls, the instruction's
vulnerability "comes from its potential to allow the State to argue that a juror must articulate
and obviate specific doubts." Halls, 2006 UT App 142, \ 17.
The forbidden argument was not made in these cases. Defendants here do not claim,
nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutors argued that the State need obviate only
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sufficiently defined doubts. In Halls, referring to the elements instruction, the prosecutor
stated, "the State has proven everything on this page beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 141:
165. In rebuttal she stated that defense counsel's "job is to raise a reasonable doubt, and he's
done the best job he can, but he can't get over the hurdle of the State's evidence in this case."
R. 141: 177. She thus argued that the State's evidence foreclosed all reasonable doubt. She
did not argue or imply that "the State . . . need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently
defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, % 28.
In Kinne, the prosecutor relied on the reasonable doubt instruction:
There's an instruction that you have that calls upon what's the State's burden
in a case like this . . . it's called the reasonable doubt instruction. You know,
we can stand up here and we can speculate and we can say, "You know what,
the State—the State didn't do this or maybe it was this other person that did
that, or maybe this occurred, or maybe that occurred," and that all falls under
one part of this that says: You don't base your decision under this kind of a
reasonable doubt instruction on speculation, . . . on fanciful imagination or
wholly speculative possibility.
What may have occurred, ladies and gentlemen, you have to have some
scintilla of evidence that something else happened. The only evidence you
have in this case about what occurred with regard to this burglary and this
stolen vehicle is what Mr. Clark told you occurred. You don't have any
evidence to the contrary. And speculation about what may have occurred is
that, speculation.
R. 126: 155-56 {Kinne). Again, the prosecutor did not argue or imply that "the State ... need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 28. He never
suggested any requirement that doubts be defined or articulated, only that they be reasonable
in light of the evidence adduced at trial.
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In Austin, the prosecutor stated merely "that reasonable doubt is a doubt based on
reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence." R. 222: 134 (Austin). This
statement is unassailable, if tautological. She did not argue or imply that "the State . . . need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^ 28.
The jury instructions given in these cases were also unobjectionable. Jury instructions
must be viewed "as a whole." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 22. So viewed, the instructions are
consistent with the principles elaborated in Reyes.
The reasonable doubt instructions here did inform the jury that the state bore the
burden to "eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 149 (Austin)', R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls).
However, read in context, this instruction did not offend Reyes.
The reasonable doubt instruction gave "an affirmative description of the degree of
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence" as required by Reyes:
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the
understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable
doubt." R. 149 (Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls); see Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 29. Like
Reyes's "safe harbor" instruction, this instruction states that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty." R. 149 (Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls);
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^ 37. And when it does define reasonable doubt, the instruction tends
to speak in unobjectionable, if not tautological, terms: "Reasonable doubt is a doubt based
on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence . . . A reasonable doubt is a doubt
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that reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the case."

R. 149

(Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls).
Moreover, the stock portions of the elements instruction given in each case repeatedly
directed jurors to scrutinize the strength of the State's case:
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows:... If you
believe that the state has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any
one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
not guilty.
R. 107-08 (Halls) (emphasis added); R. 79-80 (Kinne) (same); R. 143-44 (Austin) (same).
Under this instruction, "the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the
evidence is insufficient" would be required to acquit. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^f 28 (quoting
Sheppard, supra, at 1213).
Thus, the dangers cautioned against in Reyes never arose in these cases. Although a
Robertson "eliminate all reasonable doubt" instruction was given, the prosecutor did not
make the forbidden argument, and the instructions as a whole directed the jury to deliberate
in a manner consistent with the principles expressed in Reyes.
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Defendants waived their Robertson claims by inviting any error in the trial court.
Even if, in an appropriate case, this Court were inclined to employ the exceptional
circumstances safety device to trump invited error, it should not do so here, because
defendants suffered no manifest injustice. Being tried under an obviation instruction, as most
Utah defendants for the last quarter century have been, is not manifestly unjust.
Reyes is best understood as overruling the Robertson test, not the Robertson
instruction. Therefore, the mere fact that an obviation instruction was given here did not
violate constitutional requirements. But even if an obviation instruction is viewed as opening
the door to constitutional error, none resulted here. The prosecutors did not argue that a
reasonable doubt must be defined before it could serve as the basis for an acquittal. In
addition, the jury instructions read as a whole satisfactorily informed the jury of the State's
burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _L(_ December 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
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and
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, J., held that:
(1)
reasonable
doubt
instruction
correctly
communicated to jury the principle of reasonable
doubt, and
(2) Court of Appeals would not review issue of
whether trial court erred in enhancing defendant's
sentence based on a prior conviction of possession
of a controlled substance, as defendant invited the
error.
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A clerical error, once determined, can be amended
and made effective as of a prior date so that the
record accurately reflects that which took place.
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and

OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Tf 1 Defendant Franklin Eric Halls appeals from his
convictions of one count of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2005); one count of
unlawful possession of an imitation controlled
substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (2002);
and one count of possession of paraphernalia, see
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
\ 2 On March 1, 2004, Officer Jim Eberling of the
Monticello Police Department and Agent Travis
Clark, a parole officer from the Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, went to
Defendant's parents' house to speak to Defendant
about a possible hit-and-run accident. Upon
arriving, they discovered that Defendant was not
home and decided to wait for him to return from
work. Shortly thereafter, Defendant arrived at his
parents' home in a pickup truck driven by Jim
Abrams.
% 3 Approaching Defendant's parents' home,
Abrams glanced over at Defendant and noticed him
bending over. He testified that it looked as if
Defendant was shoving something under the seat.
Abrams dropped off Defendant and left.
^ 4 When Abrams arrived at his own home, he
checked under the seat and found a black box
containing some bags and scales. Upset that
Defendant would hide paraphernalia in *1162 his
truck, Abrams took the items he found to the police
station and gave them to Police Chief Adair.
If 5 Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark
conducted a search of Defendant, his bedroom, and
his vehicle. Agent Clark accompanied Officer
Eberling to Defendant's residence because Agent
Clark had been having some problems with
Defendant and because Defendant had recently
tested positive for methamphetamine. After
searching Defendant's bedroom and truck, Officer
Eberling and Agent Clark took Defendant to the
police station to question him regarding the
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hit-and-run accident and to possibly administer a
urinalysis drug test.
f 6 As they arrived at the police station, Chief
Adair was across the street searching Abrams's
truck. Officer Eberling and Agent Clark took
Defendant into the station for questioning. During
questioning, Chief Adair knocked on the door and
handed Officer Eberling the items found under the
seat in Abrams's truck. Those items included a bag
containing a white crystal substance, a black box
containing a set of scales and a couple of small
plastic bags, and a larger empty bag. Chief Adair
explained to Officer Eberling how Abrams found
these items.
% 7 Officer Eberling and Agent Clark then began
to question Defendant regarding the items.
Defendant first denied that the items belonged to
him, but he eventually admitted that the items were
his. Defendant told Officer Eberling and Agent
Clark that the white crystal substance was his and
that it was not methamphetamine, but a cutting
agent called "MSM." Defendant stated that he was
planning to mix the cutting agent into an ounce of
methamphetamine so that he could use one ounce
for free and sell the other. Defendant also stated
that the scales were used to weigh the
methamphetamine he sold and admitted that two of
the
small
plastic
bags
had
contained
methamphetamine. Subsequent testing confirmed
that the white crystal substance was not
methamphetamine; the small plastic bags and
scales tested positive for methamphetamine.
f 8 At trial, Defendant testified that he did not
know anything about the items found in Abrams's
truck and denied owning them. Defendant stated
that on the day he was questioned about the items
found in Abrams's truck, he believed the police had
pulled Abrams over, searched his truck, and found
the contraband. Because Officer Eberling and
Agent Clark told Defendant that he was already in
trouble for violating his parole, he decided to admit
ownership of the contraband to protect Abrams
from any potential punishment.
If 9 The jury found Defendant guilty of possession
of a controlled substance, possession of an imitation
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No

controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. After his conviction, Defendant
stipulated to a prior conviction of possession of a
controlled substance for puiposes of enhancement,
even though Defendant's prior judgment read that
he was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute. The trial court indicated that there was a
clerical error in the prior judgment, but that
Defendant clearly had the prior conviction to
enhance Defendant's current conviction to a second
degree felony, resulting in a one- to fifteen-year
sentence. Defendant appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] Tf 10 On appeal, Defendant asserts that the
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial
incorrectly stated the law and violated his due
process rights. "Whether [a jury] instruction
correctly states the law is reviewable under a
correction of error standard, with no particular
deference given to the trial court's ruling." State v.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993).
However, rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "Unless a
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give
an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Defendant admits that he never
objected to the reasonable doubt jury instruction at
trial. Therefore, pursuant to rule 19(e), Defendant's
failure to object to the reasonable doubt jury
instruction at trial renders the instruction "
reviewable for plain error, or manifest injustice,
rather than for correctness." * 1163State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45,i[ 16, 122 P.3d 543; see also State v.
Casey, 2003 UT 55,K 40, 82 P.3d 1106 ("[I]n most
circumstances [,] the term manifest injustice is
synonymous with the plain error standard ...."
(quotations and citation omitted)).
[3] ^f 11 Defendant also asserts that the trial court
erred when it enhanced Defendant's sentence based
on the parties' stipulation that Defendant had a prior
conviction for possession, because Defendant's
prior judgment incorrectly stated that the prior
conviction was for possession with the intent to
distribute. According to Defendant, since the prior
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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judgment is not correct, it cannot be a final
judgment for the purposes of enhancement.
However, because Defendant invited the error,
which he now appeals, we will not review it. We
will not review "an error committed at trial when
[Defendant] led the trial court into committing the
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah
1993).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendant's Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction

^f 12 Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt
jury instruction given at his trial incorrectly stated
the law and violated the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. At Defendant's trial,
the reasonable doubt instruction was in compliance
with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)
, overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005
UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. It instructed the jury that "
[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable doubt."
However, after Defendant's trial, the Utah Supreme
Court expressly abandoned the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" requirement of the Robertson
test. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,f 30, 116 P.3d
305. Relying on Reyes, see id., Defendant now
asserts that under the new standard, the reasonable
doubt jury instruction given at trial violated his due
process rights.
[4] TI 13 Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "Unless a
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give
an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Because Defendant admits that
he did not object to the reasonable doubt jury
instruction at trial, "we will only remand for a new
trial if the error ... constitutes a 'manifest injustice.'
" ™ Casey, 2003 UT 55 at \ 39, 82 P.3d 1106.

FN1. Based on the invited error doctrine,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "if
counsel, either by statement or act,
affirmatively represented to the court that

he or she had no objection to the jury
instruction, we will not review the
instruction under the manifest injustice
exception." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22,f 54, 70 P.3d 111. In this case,
defense counsel not only failed to object to
the reasonable doubt jury instruction, but
also expressly agreed to the reasonable
doubt jury instruction. Utah law has not
addressed whether the invited error
doctrine applies when there has been a
change of settled law. However, federal
law states that "[w]here a defendant
submits proposed jury instructions in
reliance on current law, and on direct
appeal that law is declared constitutionally
infirm, we will not apply the invited error
doctrine. Instead, we will review for plain
error." United States v. West Indies
Tramp., Inc., 127 R3d 299, 305 (3d
Cir.1997).
Because
we
similarly
acknowledge
an
exception
to
the
preservation
rule
for
exceptional
circumstances "where a change in law or
the settled interpretation of law colored the
failure to have raised an issue at trial,"
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah
Ct.App.1996), we do not apply the invited
error doctrine here.
[5] % 14 "[M]anifest injustice" has been defined as
being "synonymous with the 'plain error' standard."
Id. at K 40. The manifest injustice or the plain
error standard requires the appellant to show that " '
(i) [a]n error exists; (li) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in
the verdict is undermined.' " Id. at f 41 (quoting
State v. Powell, £72 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)).
It is under this plain error standard that we review
Defendant's appeal of the reasonable doubt jury
instruction given at his trial.
^ 15 Under the first prong of the plain error
standard, Defendant must show that "[a]n error
exists." Id. Defendant asserts that the error in the
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial is the
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use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt."
In *1164 Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court expressly
abandoned the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt"
as a requirement for a reasonable doubt jury
instruction. 2005 UT 33 at ^ 30, 116 P.3d 305.
For the purposes of this appeal, the parties do not
dispute that "obviate all reasonable doubt" and "
eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar.
However, we consider the "eliminate all reasonable
doubt" jury instruction to be less troublesome than
the Reyes "obviate all reasonable doubt" instruction.
[6] t 16 In State v. Cmz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d
543, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Reyes
effectively overruled the Robertson test for
reasonable doubt jury instructions and adopted the
test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22, 114 S.Ct.
1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). See Cruz, 2005
UT 45 at If 21, 122 P.3d 543. The Victor test
provides:
[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does
not require that any particular form of words be
used in advising the jury of the government's burden
of proof. Rather, "taken as a whole, the
instructions [must] correctly convey the concept of
reasonable doubt to the jury."
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted). This
overarching principle, that "taken as a whole, [the
reasonable doubt jury instruction must] correctly
communicate the principle of reasonable doubt" to
the jury, is now the standard for "assessing the
validity of reasonable doubt instructions." Cruz,
2005 UT 45 at U 21, 122 P.3d 543. Therefore, if
Defendant's reasonable doubt jury instruction, " *
taken as a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,' " id at ^
20 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 1239),
then it was not erroneous. We conclude that
Defendant's jury instruction was not in error.
Tf 17 The Reyes court found the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" concept "linguistically opaque
and conceptually suspect." 2005 UT 33,^f 26, 116
P.3d 305. The potential problem with the "obviate
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

all reasonable doubt" requirement is that it
contemplates
a
two-step
undertaking:
the
identification of the doubt and a testing of the
validity of the doubt against the evidence.... The "
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not,
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the
doubt or to state a reason for it.
Id. at U 27. Therefore, "ftjo the extent that the
Robertson 'obviate' test would permit the State to
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are
sufficiently defined, the test works to improperly
diminish the State's burden." Id. at ^f 28 (emphasis
added). Essentially, the obviate test's "substantial
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a
degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt,"
id. at % 30, comes from its potential to allow the
State to argue that a juror must articulate and
obviate specific doubts.
1 18 This is not the situation here. The trial
court's jury instruction stated:
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond
a reasonable
doubt. This
presumption follows the defendant throughout the
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The [S]tate must eliminate all reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an
absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a doubt
based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all
the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt
based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the
understanding
of
those
bound
to
act
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.

[7] If 19 This reasonable doubt jury instruction
given at Defendant's trial did not convey the
message that the State must only eliminate those
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the
State argue that the juror need articulate and
eliminate specific doubts. Instead, the jury
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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instruction, "taken as a whole, correctly
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt"
to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at % 21, 122 P.3d
543.
*1165 f 20 Although the language "obviate all
reasonable doubt" has been abandoned by Reyes, see
2005 UT 33 at U 34, 116 P.3d 305, we are not
persuaded that the use of "eliminate all reasonable
doubt" in Defendant's jury instruction constitutes
manifest injustice because the reasonable doubt jury
instruction "correctly communicate[d] the principle
of reasonable doubt" to the jury. State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45,H 21, 122 P.3d 543. FN2 Therefore,
we do not remand for a new trial.

FN2. In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122
P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed
reasonable
doubt
jury
instructions that included the phrase "
dispel all reasonable doubt" and found that
those instructions were not erroneous. Id.
at ffi[ 11, 18. Because "dispel all
reasonable doubt" and "eliminate all
reasonable
doubt"
are
functionally
equivalent, Defendant's reasonable doubt
jury instruction is not erroneous.
IL Defendant's Sentence Enhancement
Tf 21 Defendant also claims that the trial court
erred when it enhanced his sentence based on a
prior conviction of possession of a controlled
substance, even though Defendant stipulated to the
prior conviction. Essentially, Defendant argues
that because the judgment from his first conviction
for possession incorrectly stated that he pleaded
guilty to possession with intent to distribute, when
he actually only pleaded to simple possession, the
judgment is ineffectual.
[8][9] K 22 Defendant repeatedly stipulated to the
fact that he had a prior conviction for possession,
thereby inviting the error he now appeals. "[0]n
appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court
into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). After jury selection,

counsel for Defendant told the trial court that if the
jury found Defendant guilty, Defendant would
stipulate to a prior conviction for possession.
Defense counsel also explained that the prior
judgment contained a clerical error, but that
Defendant was still willing to stipulate to the prior
conviction. Moreover, after Defendant was found
guilty, Defendant again stipulated to the prior
conviction for possession. When the trial court
asked if there was "[a]ny legal reason why sentence
should not be pronounced," counsel for Defendant
replied, "None, your honor."
[10] [11] 1f 23 Clearly, Defendant invited the
alleged error he now appeals by repeatedly
stipulating to the fact that he had a prior conviction
for possession. The rationale behind this
stipulation is clear: regardless of whether the prior
conviction was for simple possession or possession
with intent to distribute, the prior conviction
enhanced the Defendant's sentence. Therefore,
because Defendant invited the error he now appeals,
we will not review it.FN3

FN3. In the alternative, Defendant argues
that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because he counseled Defendant
to stipulate to the prior conviction.
However, even if we were to find defense
counsel's assistance defective for this
reason, Defendant cannot prove that "but
for counsel's deficient performancef,] there
is a reasonable probability that the
outcome ... would have been different."
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,f 19,
61 P.3d 978 (quotations and citation
omitted). Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states that "[clerical
mistakes in judgments ... may be corrected
by the court at any time and after such
notice, if any, as the court may order."
Utah R.Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added).
Moreover,
a
clerical
error,
once
determined, can be amended and made "
effective as of a prior date so that the
record accurately reflects that which took
place." Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298,
299 (Utah 1984). Because both the trial
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court and the parties agreed that the error
in the prior judgment was simply clerical,
the prior judgment would still be final and
effective for the purposes of enhancing
Defendant's sentence.
CONCLUSION
^ 24 The reasonable doubt jury instruction given at
Defendant's trial is not manifestly unjust because it
correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt
to the jury. Further, because Defendant invited the
error, we decline to address Defendant's claim that
his sentence enhancement is somehow erroneous
because of a clerical error in Defendant's prior
judgment.
K 25 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Presiding Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Associate Presiding Judge.
UtahApp.,2006.
State v. Halls
134 P.3d 1160, 549 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2006 UT
App 142
END OF DOCUMENT
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BILLINGS.

BENCH,

GREENWOOD,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BILLINGS, Judge:
*1 Defendant Devon Kinner appeals his convictions
for one count each of receiving or transferring a
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, see
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2005); possession
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, see
id. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); burglary, a second degree
felony, see id. § 76-6-202 (2003); and theft, a
second degree felony, see id. §§ 76-6-412, -404
(2003). We affirm.
First, Defendant argues that the trial court's
reasonable doubt jury instruction incorrectly stated
the law and thus violated his due process rights. At
Defendant's trial, the court's reasonable doubt jury
instruction complied with State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part
by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. The
instruction informed the jury that "[t]he State must

eliminate
all reasonable
doubt." However,
following Defendant's conviction, the Utah
Supreme Court expressly abandoned the "obviate
all reasonable doubt" requirement of the Robertson
test. See Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at % 30 (quotations
omitted).
Although the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt"
and "eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar, we
conclude the language of the instruction in the
present case was not fatal to the reasonable doubt
instruction. In eliminating the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" requirement, see id., the Utah
Supreme Court essentially adopted the test
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). In Victor,
the Court stated that reasonable doubt jury
instructions are adequate if "taken as a whole,
the[y] ... correctly convey the concept of reasonable
doubt to the jury." 511 U.S. at 22. In State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, and in State v. Halls,
2006 UT App 142, jury instructions containing the
phrases "dispel all reasonable doubt," Cruz, 2005
UT 45 at TI 11, and "eliminate all reasonable doubt,
" Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at H 12, were held to
not constitute error. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at \ 22;
Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at \ 20. Both instructions
complied with the test enunciated in Victor, see 511
U.S. at 22, and expressly adopted in Cruz, see 2005
UT 45 at ^| 21, that a reasonable doubt jury
instruction must "correctly communicate the
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. Id.; Halls,
2006 UT App 142 at % 20. In this case, as in Cruz
and Halls, the reasonable doubt jury instruction "
correctly
communicate [d] the principle of
reasonable doubt" to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at
H 21; Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at ^ 20.
Defendant also argues he was denied effective
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file
a motion for a directed verdict following the denial
of his motion to dismiss. To demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that
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the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)

*2 Defendant argues that although his counsel
moved to dismiss the counts charged against him,
his counsel's performance was deficient when she
failed to also move for a directed verdict because
Utah appellate courts have imposed different
standards for granting motions for directed verdicts
than for granting motions to dismiss. We disagree.
"If the State fails to produce 'believable evidence
of all the elements of the crime charged,' the trial
court must dismiss the charges." State v. Hamilton,
2003 UT 22,K 40, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v.
Clark, 2001 UT 9,H 13, 20 P.3d 300). Believable
evidence is evidence that is "capable of supporting
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
1(41 (quotations and citation omitted).

presented a witness whose testimony directly tied
Defendant to the crimes charged. The outcome of
this case hinged largely on the credibility given to
the State's key witness. Determinations of witness
credibility are the exclusive province of the jury. See
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
Therefore, Defendant has not shown that the failure
to argue this issue constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding
Judge and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Associate
Presiding Judge.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Kinne
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1030328 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 156
END OF DOCUMENT

In a motion for a directed verdict at the end of the
State's case, the trial court must decide if "the State .
.. established] a prima facie case against the
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all
the elements of the crime charged." ' Clark, 2001
UT 9 at H 13 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d
781, 784 (Utah 1992)).
In the present case, the trial judge denied a motion
to dismiss at the close of the State's case.
Accordingly, the trial court found there was
believable evidence for each element of the crimes
charged "capable of supporting a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt ." Hamilton, 2003 UT
22 at % 41 (quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict would
have been futile because if the trial court believed
there was evidence capable of supporting a verdict
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court
would also find the jury capable of finding
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant argues that, even if the court finds that
the motion to dismiss could be construed as
functionally equivalent to a motion for a directed
verdict, the motion was deficient in its content when
it failed to argue that there was no reliable evidence
tying Defendant to the crime. However, the State
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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BENCH,

GREENWOOD,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
*1 Defendant Graham Woodruff Austin argues,
under the standard set forth in State v. Reyes, 2005
UT 33, 1f 30, 116 P.3d 305, that part of the
reasonable doubt jury instruction-"[i]t is the burden
of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt"
-violated his due process rights. Because Defendant
did not object to the reasonable doubt jury
instruction at trial, he asserts plain error on appeal.
See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ffi| 13-14. "
Under the first prong of the plain error standard,
Defendant must show that '[a]n error exists." ' Id.
at Tf 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). "
[I]f Defendant's reasonable doubt jury instruction,
taken as a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, then it was
not erroneous." Id. at ^f 16 (omission and second
alteration in original) (quotations and citations

In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt jury
instruction given at Defendant's trial did not convey
the message that the State must only eliminate those
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the
State argue that the juror need articulate and
eliminate specific doubts." Id. at % 19. As we held
in Halls, "we are not persuaded that the use of '
eliminate all reasonable doubt" ' constitutes plain
error. Id. at % 20. We conclude that the jury
instruction, "taken as a whole, correctly
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt."
State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, H 21, 122 P.3d 543.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by
(1) imposing consecutive sentences without the
benefit of a presentence investigation report (PSI)
and (2) failing to adequately consider Defendant's
history, remorse, and rehabilitative needs in
violation of Utah Code section 76-3-401(2), see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003).
"Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court
may, with the concurrence of the defendant,
continue the date for the imposition of sentence ...
for the purpose of obtaining a[PSI] ... or
information from other sources about the defendant.
" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (Supp.2005)
(emphasis added). FN1 This statute gives the trial
court discretion to impose a sentence without
ordering a PSI. See State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App
345, ffi[ 13-15, 57 P.3d 1134. Additionally,
Defendant specifically requested that the trial court "
waive his time for sentencing and be sentenced
today," knowing that no PSI would be completed.
The trial court granted Defendant's request and
sentenced him immediately after the trial concluded.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing
Defendant without the benefit of a PSI.

FN1. There have been no relevant
amendments to the applicable statutes
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crimes in this matter. For convenience, we
therefore cite to the most recent version of
the statutes.

END OF DOCUMENT

Further, in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences, the trial court is required to "
consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Defendant asserts
that the trial court was unable to sufficiently
consider "his histoiy, his remorse, and his
rehabilitative needs," in large part because a PSI
had not been completed.
*2 "Although the trial court did not explicitly
address the enumerated factors in section
[76-3-401(2) ], there is ample evidence in the
record that the court considered these factors at the
time of Defendant's sentencing." State v.
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, fl 30, 82 P.3d 1167
. The trial court here received evidence concerning
Defendant's
drug
addiction,
the
recent
hospitalization of his mother, his failing marriage,
his recent unemployment, and his car braking down.
The trial court also received evidence concerning
Defendant's immediate remorse, his apology to the
victim's family at trial, and the victim impact
statements. As a result, we hold that the trial court
sufficiently considered all of the sentencing factors
and did not abuse its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences. Furthermore, Defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without
merit because counsel was not "objectively deficient
" in not objecting to the lack of a PSI and to the
imposition of consecutive sentences. State v.
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, H 21, 9 P.3d 777.
Accordingly, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
UtahApp.,2006.
State v. Austin
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 184
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State v. ReyesUtah,2005.
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, Petitioner, and
Cross-Respondent,
v.
German Cruz REYES, Defendant, Respondent, and
Cross-Petitioner.
No. 20040078.
June 7, 2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
William Barrett, J., of aggravated sexual assault.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 84 P.3d
841, reversed and remanded.

Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=ni34(7)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General
110k! 134(7) k. Extent of Review as
Determined by Mode Thereof. Most Cited Cases
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews the decision
of the Court of Appeals for correctness, giving its
conclusions of law no deference.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=>561(1)

Holdings: On grant of both parties petition for
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held that:
(1) a jury is not required to be instructed that to
return a guilty verdict, it must obviate all reasonable
doubts;
(2) trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt,
which stated that reasonable doubt is "not doubt
which is merely possible," appropriately addressed
concept of "possibility" in gauging reasonableness
of doubt;
(3) State courts are authorized to instruct regarding
reasonable doubt by giving Federal Judicial Center
instruction, stating that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof that leaves jurors firmly convinced of
defendant's guilt, and that the law does not require
proof that overcomes every doubt; and
(4) trial judge's decision to recite jury instructions
prior to trial and not repeat such instructions at the
close of evidence complied with rule requiring court
to instruct jury at close of evidence, and rule
governing giving of jury instructions.

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
HOXVII(V) Weight and Sufficiency
110k561 Reasonable Doubt
110k561(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
No person accused may be convicted of a crime
unless each element of the offense has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[3] Criminal Law 110 €=^789(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(G)
Instructions:
Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k789 Reasonable Doubt
110k789(4)
k.
Sufficiency
of
Instructions as to Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
Most Cited Cases
A jury is not required to be instructed that to return
a guilty verdict, it must obviate all reasonable
doubts.
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^>789(2)

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

116P.3d305

Page 2

116 P.3d 305, 527 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2005 UT 33
(Cite as: 116 P.3d 305)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
HOXX(G)
Instructions:
Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k789 Reasonable Doubt
110k789(2)
k.
Sufficiency
of
Definitions of Reasonable Doubt in General. Most
Cited Cases
Trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt, which
stated that reasonable doubt is "not doubt which is
merely possible," appropriately addressed concept
of "possibility" in gauging the reasonableness of
doubt; instruction was followed by the explanatory
phrase "since everything in human affairs is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt," and such
language effectively neutralized the risk that the
reference to a "mere possibility" would have
improperly led a juror to apply a standard of proof
lesser than beyond a reasonable doubt.
[5] Criminal Law 110 €=^789(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(G)
Instructions:
Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k789 Reasonable Doubt
110k789(4)
k.
Sufficiency
of
Instructions as to Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
Most Cited Cases
State courts are authorized to instruct regarding
reasonable doubt by giving Federal Judicial Center
instruction, stating that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of
the defendant's guilt, that there are very few things
in this world that we know with absolute certainty
and in criminal cases the law does not require proof
that overcomes every possible doubt, that juror
must find defendant guilty if juror is firmly
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, and that juror must give defendant the
benefit of the doubt if juror thinks that there is real
possibility that defendant is not guilty.
[6] Criminal Law 110 ^ 8 0 1
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(G)

Instructions:

Necessity,

Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k801 k. Time for Giving Instructions.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €^>806(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
HOXX(G)
Instructions:
Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k806 Repetition
110k806(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Trial judge's decision to recite jury instructions
prior to trial and not repeat such instructions at the
close of evidence complied with rule requiring court
to instruct jury at close of evidence, and rule
governing giving of jury instructions; rule requiring
trial court to instruct jury at close of evidence did
not demand repetition of even "vital rights"
instructions in cases of short duration, of which
defendant's case was, as less than 24 hours
separated trial court's reading of the preliminary
instructions from the conclusion of evidence, and
jury had been provided with a written copy of every
instruction. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(g)(6), 19.

*306 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic
Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Michael E. Postma, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
Kent R. Hart, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
U 1 We granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals's ruling that the reasonable doubt
instruction used in the trial of German Cruz Reyes
was improper because it did not specifically
conform to the three-part reasonable doubt
instruction upheld by this court in State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, %
25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 1000. The State asks us to
overrule Robertson. We also agreed to take up Mr.
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Reyes's cross-petition, which challenges the court of
appeals's deteimination that the trial court's refusal
to reread preliminary jury instructions at the close
of evidence was harmless error. Because we share
the court of appeals's misgivings about the wisdom
of Robertson, we reverse the court of appeals's *307
holding on the reasonable doubt instruction and
announce a "safe harbor" reasonable doubt
instruction. We also affirm, on other grounds, the
court of appeals's decision on the timing of the jury
instructions.

BACKGROUND
FN1. For a complete recitation of the facts,
see State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffij
2-13,84P.3d841.
\ 2 In 2002, the State charged Mr. Reyes with
aggravated assault. Before the trial began, the
court proposed reading the eighteen preliminary
instructions,
including
instructions
on the
presumption of innocence and the definition of
reasonable doubt. Mr. Reyes objected to an initial
reading of the instructions unless the court reread
the instructions at the end of the trial, arguing that a
failure to recite the instructions at the close of the
evidence would violate his due process rights and
Utah law. Mr. Reyes also objected to the content
of the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction.
The instruction read:
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence,
are in favor of innocence. A defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable
doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is
entitled to acquittal.
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to
an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is
required, not doubt which is merely possible, since
everything in human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies
your mind and convinces your conscientious
understanding.
Reasonable
doubt
is
doubt

entertained by reasonable men and women and
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the
case.

\ 3 Mr. Reyes asserted this instruction was
improper because it did not pass the three-part
content test announced in State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ] 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d
1000. Mr. Reyes cited first, the instruction's failure
to comply with Robertson's mandate that a
reasonable doubt instruction "specifically state that
the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt"
and, second, its improper inclusion of the phrase "
doubt which is merely possible," id. at 1232.
1f 4 The trial court turned away both of Mr. Reyes's
objections. At the conclusion of opening
statements, the court read the eighteen preliminary
jury instructions and provided each juror with a
written copy of them. The next day, before closing
arguments, the court read fourteen additional
instructions and again provided each juror a written
copy of the instructions. The jury found Mr. Reyes
guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him
to two concurrent terms of fifteen years to life. Mr.
Reyes appealed.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS REYES
AND REASONABLE DOUBT
% 5 Mr. Reyes took two issues to the court of
appeals. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, H 1, 84
P.3d 841. First, he repeated his claim that the trial
court violated his "due process and jury trial rights"
under the United States Constitution because the
trial court's reasonable doubt instruction did not
utilize the specific language from Robertson
requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt"
and "erroneously stated that reasonable doubt is ...
not doubt which is merely possible." Id. at ^f 16.
Second, Mr. Reyes argued that when the trial court
refused to reread the eighteen preliminary jury
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) and
therefore "his due process rights to a fair trial." Id.
at ^ 2 3 .
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If 6 Mr. Reyes argued that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" jury instruction was defective
because it failed to comport with the Robertson test.
Id. at H 16. The court of appeals took up its
analysis of Mr. Reyes's challenge not with
Robertson, but with the United States Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on reasonable
doubt in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct.
1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). In Victor, the
Supreme Court held:
*308 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a
requirement of due process, but the Constitution
neither prohibits trial courts from defining
reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a
matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court
instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, ... the Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the
jury of the government's burden of proof. Rather,
taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly
convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.
Id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
% 1 The court of appeals contrasted the Supreme
Court's guidance on reasonable doubt with ours in
Robertson. Robertson, which has been our sole
occasion to review a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instruction since the Supreme Court handed down
Victor, did not acknowledge the existence of Victor.
Instead, we ratified and applied a three-part
evaluative model first suggested by Justice Stewart
in his dissent in State v. Ireland, 113 P 2d 1375,
1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Robertson described the test as follows:
First, "the instruction should specifically state that
the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt."
Second, the instruction should not state that a
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,"
as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility," although it is permissible to instruct
that a "fanciful or wholly speculative possibility
ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted).
^ 8 The court of appeals hewed tightly to the
Robertson test in assessing Mr. Reyes's challenge.
It held that the reasonable doubt instruction given
the jury in Mr. Reyes's trial failed the first and third
Robertson elements, and it accordingly remanded
for a new trial. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at fflf
21-22, 84 P.3d 841. The court of appeals reached
its holding reluctantly, agreeing with the State that
the rigor of the Robertson test could not be
reconciled with Victor's expansive approach to the
content of reasonable doubt instructions. Id. at ^f
21.
H 9 The court of appeals also concluded that the
trial court erred when it did not repeat the
preliminary jury instructions at the close of
evidence. Id. at ^ 24. The court read Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) to unambiguously
require that the jury should be instructed " '[w]hen
the evidence is concluded and at any other
appropriate time.' " Id. (quoting Utah R.Crim. P.
17(g)(6)). It interpreted this language to mandate a
repetition of all instructions vital to the defendant's
rights at the conclusion of evidence irrespective of
when or how the court had previously delivered
those instructions. However, the court of appeals
held that this error was harmless because there was
no likelihood that, had the trial court repeated the
preliminary instructions at the close of evidence, the
verdict would have been any different. Both
parties petitioned for certiorari, which we granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] ^| 10 "On certiorari, we review the court of
appeals'[s] decision for correctness, giving its
conclusions of law no deference." State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 7, 86 P.3d 742.

ANALYSIS
I. UTAH'S REASONABLE DOUBT
INSTRUCTION
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[2] If 11 No person accused in the United States
may be convicted of a crime unless each element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct.
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Supreme Court
has assigned this standard of proof constitutional
status, linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right
to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. *3Q9Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182
(1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 364, 90 S.Ct.
1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we
insist be held by those entrusted with judging the
fate of persons charged with crimes before we will
permit the State to wield its power to punish is not
only a measure of evidence, but also in a more
fundamental sense a gauge of our nations
conscience. The measure of certainty the law
demands before finding guilt reflects the balance we
are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the
conviction and punishment of the innocent.
Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the
measure of certainty required to convict in a
civilized society when he stated that "the law holds
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer." 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *27, quoted in Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 456, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed.
481(1895).
% 12 Although Blackstone expresses a moral ideal
of justice which claims few detractors, his terse
pronouncement on the State's burden of proof still
leaves unanswered the question of what degree of
satisfaction a juror must have with the quality and
quantity of evidence before finding a defendant
guilty. That we have settled on "beyond a
reasonable doubt" as an answer does not fully
relieve the unease courts have felt over the
imprecision of this time-honored standard. The
nagging sense that the law can and should "do better
" than merely instruct jurors that they must find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt accounts for a long
quest to formulate a clearer, more concise, and
more understandable reasonable doubt jury
instruction. For the most part, the role of this
court, like that of most appellate courts, has been as
a critic of reasonable doubt instructions. In

keeping with the responsibilities of an appellate
court, our contributions to the attainment of an ideal
"beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction have
appeared in the form of periodic piecemeal
pronouncements approving or rejecting words,
phrases, or concepts that litigants have chosen to
bring to us on appeal As the court of appeals's
struggle with Robertson aptly confirms, this process
has not produced a track record of steady or swift
evolutionary progress.
*| 13 The United States Supreme Court has
followed an approach similar to ours. Although
having granted the standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" a constitutional pedigree, the
Supreme Court has done little to provide direction
for its integration into the day-to-day operation of
the criminal justice system. As Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)
, makes clear, the Court has instead elected to
sanction great flexibility in the manner in which the
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is
corhmunicated to juries. See id. at 5, 114 S.Ct.
1239 ("So long as the court instructs the jury on the
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt ... the Constitution does
not require that any particular form of words be
used in advising the jury of the government's burden
of proof.").
% 14 Because it provides useful context for our
discussion of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" and
sets out the standard of review that we apply in
place of Robertson, we take a closer look at Victor.
Victor came to the Supreme Court as a consolidated
review of two challenges to the content of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" jury instructions, one from
California and one from Nebraska. Id. at 6, 114
S.Ct. 1239. The Court affirmed the constitutionality
of both instructions. Id. The majority was
persuaded that, when the instructions were
considered as a whole, there was not a reasonable
likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a
manner resulting in a fmding of guilt based on a
lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 14-17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 1239.
% 15 The Supreme Court had previously extended
to the states its declaration that the "beyond a
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reasonable doubt" standard is a necessary element
of federal due process. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278,
113 S.Ct. 2078. Still, citing its lack of supervisory
authority over state courts, the Victor Court stopped
short of announcing a definitive reasonable doubt
instruction for use in state courts. 511 U.S. at 6,
114 S.Ct. 1239. Rather, it reiterated that the
demands of due process are met when, " 'taken as a
whole, the instructions correctly conve[y] the
concept of reasonable *310 doubt to the jury.' " Id.
(quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121,
140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)). The
concept of reasonable doubt can be communicated
in many ways as "the Constitution neither prohibits
trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor
requires them to do so as a matter of course." Id. at
5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citations omitted).
A. The State's Challenge to the Reasonable Doubt
Instruction
% 16 According to the State, this court has lost
touch with the reasonable doubt directives of the
United States Supreme Court. In the State's view,
we have strayed from fidelity to constitutional
principles by forsaking the linguistic latitude in the
formulation of reasonable doubt instructions
approved by the Supreme Court in favor of what the
State characterizes as the mechanical and
unworkable Robertson test.
% 17 In this case, the court of appeals found that
the trial court's reasonable doubt instructions failed
the Robertson test and rejected them. Reyes, 2004
UT App 8 at % 22, 84 P.3d 841. The State does
not fault the court of appeals for this holding, noting
that it took pains to distance itself from the outcome
when it stated that, "[although [the Robertson] test
may be constitutionally flawed, it is not within our
power to overrule it." Id.
\ 18 The Robertson test would not be "
constitutionally flawed" were it merely to impose
restrictions on permissible language that could be
used to define "beyond a reasonable doubt," as
Victor expressly recognized
that
countless
constitutionally permissible "beyond a reasonable
doubt" formulations could be crafted. Victor, 511

U.S. at 5-6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Victor also expressly
approved the bare charge that the jury find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, unadorned by any
supplemental definition at all. Id. Thus, the
Robertson test could be constitutionally defective
only if one or more of its three elements required
Utah courts to incorporate language in their "
beyond a reasonable doubt" instructions that were
at odds with Victor's injunction that instructions not
create a reasonable likelihood that " 'a reasonable
juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow
a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below
that required by the Due Process Clause.' " Id. at 6,
114 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting Cage v. Louisiana, 498
U.S. 39, 41, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990)

If 19 Mr. Reyes has challenged the reasonable
doubt instruction in his case under the United States
Constitution. He has not raised claims under the
Utah Constitution. Thus, we, like the court of
appeals, restrict our inquiry to the federal
constitution. This limitation, however, is of little
consequence here, inasmuch as none of our
decisions that address the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard have turned on an interpretation of
the Utah Constitution. We readily concede that
neither Robertson nor its predecessors draw upon,
account for, or explain their relationship to the body
of United States Supreme Court law on the subject
of reasonable doubt. Implicit in our "beyond a
reasonable doubt" cases, however, is the
understanding that they are to be properly measured
against the standards established by the Supreme
Court.
% 20 This is not to say that Victor, or any other
Supreme Court case addressing reasonable doubt
for that matter, contains clear directions to those
charged with drafting "beyond a reasonable doubt"
jury instructions. As the State acknowledges, the
themes of Supreme Court reasonable doubt
jurisprudence are broadly stated and include a
reluctance to impose upon state courts a script for a
national
reasonable
doubt
instruction;
an
acknowledgment that the English language enjoys
sufficient richness and variety in its storehouse of
words to permit many formulations for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that correctly convey its
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meaning; and a conviction that even words that in
isolation might be constitutionally offensive may be
rehabilitated when considered in their context. See
id. at 5-6, 8-15, 114S.Ct. 1239.
If 21 Given the structure and rationale of the
Supreme Court's "beyond a reasonable doubt"
jurisprudence, its constraints on this court are few.
We are, of course, forbidden to approve reasonable
doubt language that the Supreme Court has
categorically rejected. Yet only once has the
Supreme Court *311 held a reasonable doubt
instruction to violate the Due Process Clause, and
that case highlights the difficulties associated with
keeping faith with the Court's guidelines. See Cage,
498 U.S. at 40-41, 111 S.Ct. 328. In Cage, the
Court held that the words "substantial" and "grave,"
when used to describe the degree of doubt
necessary to require acquittal, unconstitutionally
diminished the State's burden by overstating the
quantum of uncertainty that "substantial" and "grave
" created a reasonable doubt. Id.
U 22 Following Cage, a court may have reasonably
concluded it deployed either "substantial" or "grave
" into a reasonable doubt instruction at its peril.
This did not, however, prove to be the case. Victor
redeemed "substantial." 511 U.S. at 19-21, 114
S.Ct. 1239. Writing for six justices, Justice
O'Connor conducted a detailed contextual parsing
of Mr. Victor's jury instruction, which contained the
term "substantial doubt," and concluded that when
it was used to distinguish a form of doubt from
mere "fanciful conjecture," id. at 20, 114 S.Ct.
1239, it was sufficiently clear that the intended
meaning of "substantial" was "not seeming or
imaginary," and not the offending that "specified to
a large degree" meaning found in Cage, id. at 9,
114 S.Ct. 1239. As the fate of the word "substantial"
illustrates, the work of gauging the constitutionality
of a reasonable doubt jury instruction is highly
context-dependent. For this reason, it is
unproductive to cull from an instruction certain
words and phrases and make claims either for or
against the constitutionality of a jury instruction
based on the Supreme Court's response to their use
in a challenged instruction.
^ 23 The Supreme Court's approval of providing

no definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
further complicates the task of identifying and
applying federal constitutional standards to
reasonable doubt instructions. That a jury may
return a constitutionally-sanctioned verdict either
unaided by any instruction defining reasonable
doubt whatsoever, or one guided by instructions
constructed in diverse ways, seems to suggest that
the Supreme Court is engaging in a form of legal
agnosticism-conceding that an ideal definition of
reasonable doubt may exist, but despairing that any
one will ever know what it looks like.

B. Turning Away From "Obviate all Reasonable
Doubt"
[3] H 24 Against this backdrop, we turn to the
instruction to which Mr. Reyes takes exception.
The court of appeals felt constrained to reject the "
beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction used in Mr.
Reyes's trial because they failed to satisfy the
Robertson requirements that the State must "obviate
all reasonable doubt" and that it must avoid use of
the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a
possibility." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at ffif 19, 22,
84 P.3d 841. The court of appeals applied two
standards of review. Id. at <[ f 14, 16. First, it
reviewed under a nondeferential correction of error
standard the question of whether the reasonable
doubt jury instruction properly applied the law set
out in Robertson. Id. at % 14. It then assessed
whether the failure to conform to the Robertson test
was a "structural error" infringing on Mr. Reyes's
guarantee of due process. Id. at ^ 16.
1f 25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr.
Reyes's claim that the trial court erred when it failed
to expressly instruct that the State's proof must "
obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by
Robertson. Id. at % 19. The "obviate all
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's
dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82
(Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There,
Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id.
He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any
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definition of the standard must reference the
obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by the
evidence, and must convey the principle that the
State must surmount the obstacle of reasonable
doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a
fear that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth
of a charge against a defendant, a juror might
misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
*312 unless she is required to search out, confront,
and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence.
If 26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's
image of "beyond a reasonable doubt" may be, his
suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate all
reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and
conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront
evidence in its deliberations sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt
is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or
lacking in credibility. In these instances, a
description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction
concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a
more accurate and useful concept of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" than does a construct that
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether
the evidence overcomes them. A universal
application of the notion that the State must "
obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only
by tying it to the concept of the presumption of
innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of
inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must
overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the
State must "obviate reasonable doubts" in every
case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy
view of the presumption of innocence.
% 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all
reasonable doubt" standard is also flawed because,
contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that
respect violates the Victor standard. The "obviation
" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking:
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the
validity of the doubt against the evidence. This
process suggests a back and forth disputation of a
doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether
the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt.

The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does
not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the
doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated
conviction that the State has failed to meet its
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to
acquit.
% 28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate"
test would permit the State to argue that it need only
obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test
works to improperly diminish the State's burden.
Writing in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor
Steve
Sheppard
criticized
the
expanding
prominence of the requirement that doubts be
articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses
of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of
Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003).
Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice of
this trend this way:
A troubling conclusion that arises from the
difficulties of the requirement of articulability is
that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on
the belief that the totality of the evidence is
insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an
obligation that appears focused on the details of the
arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance
in which the rhetoric of the law, particularly the
presumption of innocence and the state burden of
proof, require acquittal.
Id. at 1213.
% 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of
the "obviate all reasonable doubt" element of
Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be
clearly and fairly communicated through an
affirmative description of the degree of conviction
that must be attained by a juror based on the
evidence. We see little to be gained by including
within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction
the potentially confusing concept that every
defendant is entitled to a presumption of reasonable
doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate.
Tf 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all
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reasonable doubt" element of the Robertson test
carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror
to find guilt based on a degree of proof below
beyond a reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it.

the explanatory phrase " 'since everything in human
affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.'
" This language effectively neutralizes the risk that
the reference to a "mere possibility" will improperly
lead a juror to apply a standard of proof lesser than
beyond a reasonable doubt.

C. Reasonable Doubt Cannot be a "Mere Possibility

[4] ^[ 31 We turn next to Mr. Reyes's claim that the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" *313 instruction in his
case offended the Robertson proscription against
the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a
possibility." This element of Robertson was also
the product of Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland.
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citing Ireland, 773
P.2d at 1380-82) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart's fundamental objection to excluding "mere
possibility" from eligibility for consideration as
reasonable doubt was that the term "possibility,"
standing alone, fails to disclose its location on the
continuum marked at its extremes by impossibility
and certainty. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). We stand by this observation.
^ 32 Robertson correctly noted that neither Justice
Stewart's dissent in Ireland nor the Robertson test it
spawned outlawed all references to "possibilities"
in defining reasonable doubt. Robertson, 932 P.2d
at 1232-33. To the contrary, Robertson endorsed
Justice Stewart's approval of language that " '
fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not
to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id.
(quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
T[ 33 When complemented by appropriate
qualifying and explanatory language, the use of the
term "mere possibility" in the definition of doubt
does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury
would apply an unconstitutionally diminished
standard of proof. In fact, as the court of appeals
observed, one of the instructions at issue in Victor
survived a challenge to its definition of reasonable
doubt as "not a mere possible doubt." Reyes, 2004
UT App 8 at i| 18, 84 P.3d 841 (quoting Victor,
511 U.S. at 7, 114 S.Ct. 1239). Here, the exclusion
of doubt which is " 'merely possible5 " from
consideration as a reasonable doubt is followed by

If 34 We conclude that the requirement that the
jury be instructed that it must "obviate all
reasonable doubt" before it may find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is flawed and must be abandoned.
The instruction given to Mr. Reyes's jury
appropriately addressed the concept of "possibility"
in gauging the reasonableness of doubt. We
therefore reverse the court of appeals on this issue
and affirm Mr. Reyes's conviction.

D. A "Clear, Straightforward and Accurate"
Definition of Reasonable Doubt
[5] If 35 Although we have allied ourselves with
the Supreme Court in our skepticism of the value of
"talismatic phraseology" to define the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, State v. Young, 853
P.2d 327, 347 (Utah 1993), we are convinced that
the time has come to provide express guidance to
trial courts concerning the contents of a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" instruction. We are moved to
take this action for several reasons. First, there
exists a substantial inventory of reasonable doubt
formulations that have gained either express or tacit
ratification by this court and other state and federal
courts. There is an understandable tendency to
insert within a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
instruction multiple definitions in the hope that
singularly or collectively they may bring to jurors
clarity of understanding. Such a practice is just as
likely to bring about the real but unintended result
of making reasonable doubt less comprehensible.
An instruction larded with multiple definitions of
reasonable doubt may also convey the incorrect
message that a doubt must survive review under
each definition before it may qualify as a "
reasonable doubt."
% 36 We have earlier explained our dissatisfaction
with the historical approaches to appellate review of
"beyond a reasonable doubt." In general, the
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experience of appellate review of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" instructions has been one marked
by the enterprise of winnowing out ill-conceived
notions of reasonable doubt. Left to follow this
historical practice, we are doubtful that a
serviceable "reasonable doubt" instruction will ever
emerge.
K 37 We therefore exercise our supervisory
authority to promulgate for use in the courts *314 of
this state the instruction proposed by the Federal
Judicial Center that reads:
"The [State] has the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some
of you may have served as jurors in civil cases,
where you were told that it is only necessary to
prove that a fact is more likely true than not true.
In criminal cases, the [State's] proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt.
There are very few things in this world that we
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases
the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of
the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must
find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think
there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him
not guilty."
Victor, 511 U.S. at 27, 114 S.Ct 1239 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern
Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (instruction 21) ).
1f 38 The use of this instruction was advocated by
Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in
Victor. Id.
She described it as
"clear,
straightforward, and accurate." Id. at 26, 114 S.Ct.
1239. We agree. Moreover, in the span of time
since its promulgation in 1987, the instruction has
enjoyed a positive reception.1^2 We believe that
the consistent application of this instruction
resolves any uncertainty in the phrase "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and will benefit jurors while
setting forth a balanced charge to the State and

defendants. Yet, we note that history has proven
that defining "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a
process of evolution and adaptation, and in the
future new definitions may emerge. Moreover, we
recognize that instructions that once enjoyed
widespread acceptance became anachronistic and
inaccurate due to shifting definitions of terms.™3
In recognition of this possibility, we authorize use
of Federal Judiciary Center Instruction 21 in Utah
courts as a "safe harbor" instruction, but we stop
short of disqualifying as constitutionally defective
other reasonable doubt instructions that conform to
the principles announced in this opinion.

FN2. See, eg., State v. Prasertphong, 206
Ariz. 70, 75 P.3d 675, 696 (2003);
Arizona v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898
P.2d 970, 974 (1995) (adopting and
requiring use of the Federal Judicial
Center's Jury Instruction 21 as advocated
by Justice Ginsburg because "the Federal
Judicial Center's proposed definition most
fairly and accurately conveys the meaning
of reasonable doubt"); Mills v. State, 732
A.2d 845, 852 (Del. 1999) (upholding the
jury instruction given, which was "almost
identical to the model explanation
proposed by the Federal Judicial Center");
Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 81
(D.C.1998) (observing that "the approval
of a single instruction for use in all
criminal trials will not intrude unduly into
the area of trial court discretion, for the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is applicable to every criminal trial
and is not subject to change because of the
evidence or legal theories presented.")
Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902
(Ind.1996) (recommended the Federal Jury
Instruction 21 stating that "[a] substantial
improvement in effective communication
may be achieved by utilization of the
Federal
Judicial
Center's
proposed
instruction").
FN3. See, eg, Victor, 511 U.S. at 8, 114
S Ct. 1239. There the Court reviewed the
reasonable doubt instruction used in Mr.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 11

116P.3d305
116 P.3d 305, 527 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2005 U T 33
(Cite as: 116 P.3d 305)
Sandoval's case. The instruction was set
forth in 1850 in Commonwealth v. Webster,
59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), and for almost
one hundred years was heralded as "
probably the most satisfactory definition
ever given to the words 'reasonable doubt'
in any case known to criminal
jurisprudence." People v. Strong, 30 Cal.
151, 155 (1866). The instruction utilized
the phrase "moral certainty," which caused
the Victor Court some concern because, as
Justice O'Connor wrote, the phrase in Mr.
Sandoval's case did not likely have the
same textual meaning as when it was
written in 1850. Victor, 511 U.S. at 13,
114 S.Ct. 1239. She observed that "
[w]ords and phrases can change meaning
over time: A passage generally understood
in 1850 may be incomprehensible or
confusing to a modern juror." Id. The
Court responded that it did not condone
the phrase "moral certainty," but felt that
overall it did not render the reasonable
doubt instruction infirm. Id. at 16-17, 114
S.Ct. 1239.

R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6). The court of appeals
concluded that the text of the rule required that the
trial court repeat the recitation of preliminary jury
instructions at the close of the evidence. Reyes,
2004 UT App 8 at ffl[ 23-24, 84 P.3d 841. It
therefore held that the trial court erred in refusing
Mr. Reyes's request for a second recitation of the
instructions at the conclusion of evidence. Id. at ^
26. Having determined that the trial court violated
rule 17(g)(6), the court of appeals reasoned that it
need not take up Mr. Reyes's claim that the failure
to comply with rule 17(g)(6)'s timing requirements
for reciting instructions denied him due process. Id.
at U 26 n. 7. It then analyzed the degree of
prejudice the error caused Mr. Reyes. Id. at % 27.
Using the standard set out in rule 30 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by State
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987), the court
of appeals found the error harmless because the
likelihood of a different outcome was not
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the
verdict. Id. at Iffi 27-28.

[6] H 39 We granted Mr. Reyes's cross-petition for
certiorari to review the court of *315 appeals's
determination that although the trial court erred
when it failed to repeat its recitation of jury
instructions at the close of the evidence, the error
was harmless. He insists that, as an error of
constitutional dimension, the failure to reinstruct the
jury could not be harmless. We affirm the result
reached by the court of appeals that Mr. Reyes was
not entitled to a new trial based on the timing of the
trial court's recitation of jury instructions, but do so
on the grounds that the trial court did not commit
error.

1} 41 Mr. Reyes does not challenge the court of
appeals's conclusion that the trial court's error did
not undermine confidence in the guilty verdict
rendered against him. Rather, he contends that the
trial court's error was constitutional in its nature and
structural in its magnitude and, thus, its gravity was
more substantial than the court of appeals
acknowledged. For this reason, Mr. Reyes argued
that the harmless error test employed by the court of
appeals was not sufficiently rigorous. Where a
defendant's
constitutional rights have been
infringed, prejudice should be presumed or, at a
minimum, the burden should be placed on the State
to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, Mr. Reyes's challenge to
the propriety of the court of appeals's standard for
evaluating harmlessness is inextricably connected to
the nature of the right associated with the timing of
the recitation of jury instructions.1^4

If 40 The court of appeals applied a plain meaning
analysis to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(g)(6). State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ] 24, 84
P.3d 841. Rule 17(g)(6) instructs that "[w]hen the
evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate
time, the court shall instruct the jury." Utah

FN4. We note that neither the State nor
Mr. Reyes sought certiorari to challenge
the court of appeals's determination that
the trial court erred when it failed to repeat
its recitation of the preliminary instructions

II. MR. REYES'S APPEAL ON FAILURE TO
REINSTRUCT THE JURY
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at the close of the evidence. However,
our consideration of this issue is made
permissible, even inevitable, by the
formulation of Mr. Reyes's cross-petition
for certiorari review. By urging us to
consider whether the trial court's jury
instruction method resulted in a violation
of his constitutional rights, Mr. Reyes has
asked us to examine the magnitude of the
trial court's error. This inquiry logically
and necessarily includes the possibility that
we might conclude that no error occurred.
% 42 Based on our assessment of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding
the trial court's
presentation of instructions to the jury, we hold that
the timing of the trial court's recitation of jury
instructions complied with rule 17(g)(6). Since
there was no error, we need not review the court of
appeals's assessment of the harmfulness of the error.
U 43 Rule 17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that "[w]hen the evidence is c
oncluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury." Utah R.Crim. P.
17(g)(6). Contrary to the court of appeals's
determination that this provision is unambiguous,
we can extract several plausible interpretations of
its text. The interpretative divide occurs at the
term "instruct." One reasonable interpretation of
rule 17(g)(6) is the one embraced by the court of
appeals. Under its rendition of the text, the rule
mandates a complete rereading of all instructions
when the evidence is concluded. *316 This
interpretation can be traced to the assumption that
the word "instruct," although a verb, also connotes
a noun defined as the entire body of jury
instructions. The court of appeals finds comfort in
this reading because it inoculate the rule against the
mischief of permitting a trial court to comply with
its terms by merely reading one instruction at the
close of the evidence. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at ^
24,84P.3d841.
f 44 The interpretation chosen by the court of
appeals to sidestep one absurd result exposes the
rule to an equally incongruous one. A complete
repetition of instructions would force a judge to
read and the jury to endure instructions, such as

those describing "order of presentation" or "
note-taking", that have no relevance at the close of
the trial and have no bearing on law applicable to
the case or to the jury's responsibilities upon retiring
to deliberate. A categorical requirement that all
instructions be repeated at the close of evidence
would strip the trial judge of any discretion in
selecting timely and helpful directions to the jury
and would likely tend to distract the jury and dilute
its attention to critical substantive and procedural
guidance present in other instructions. In implicit
recognition of the difficulties with a categorical and
nondiscretionary reading of rule 17(g)(6), the court
of appeals first embraced, but then receded from the
requirement that a trial court reread at the close of
the evidence all of the instructions it had previously
delivered. While at first indicating that a trial court
would violate rule 17(g)(6) "by giving the jury
some of its instructions before opening statements
(an "appropriate time") and the rest of its
instructions before closing arguments," the court
modified its view by the time it announced its
holding. Id. There, it insisted only that the trial
court repeat only those instructions that relate to the
defendant's fundamental rights. Id. It is not clear to
us how this retreat from an "all or nothing"
interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) can be squared with a
plain meaning interpretation of the rule that finds its
text unambiguous.
f 45 A second plausible interpretation of rule
17(g)(6) can be derived by restricting the meaning
of "instruct" to its verb form, describing the act of
reciting an instruction. This interpretation would
require trial judges to provide some instruction
when the evidence is concluded, but would not offer
guidance on the nature and extent of the instructions
to be given at that stage of the trial. In our view, an
interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) that leaves undefined
the scope of instructions that the court must recite at
the close of the evidence is preferable to a rendering
of the rule that, in its attempt to achieve certainty
and uniformity in the presentation of instructions,
will accomplish the opposite. Trial judges faced
with the obligation to repeat all instructions
previously recited at the conclusion of the evidence
would have good reason to opt to avoid giving
preliminary instructions at all rather than risk the
confusion and distraction of repeating instructions
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ill-suited for that occasion. We have scant
reservation about resolving the ambiguity created
by construing "instruct" as a verb by ceding to trial
judges the discretion to determine the appropriate
instructions to deliver to the jury at the close of the
evidence.
^[46 Although we agree generally with the court of
appeals's concern that the jury be instructed "on
matters of law vital to the rights of a defendant" at
the close of the evidence, we do not read rule
17(g)(6) to demand the repetition of even "vital
rights" instructions at the close of the evidence in
all instances. In a trial of short duration or where
the trial judge has had occasion to provide
instruction concerning one or more "vital rights"
shortly before the close of the evidence, the jury's
comprehension of those "vital rights" may be
enhanced by the judicious exercise of the judge's
discretion in fashioning close of evidence
instructions which take a form other than a
rereading of instructions previously delivered.
% 47 The paramount goal that guides the timing of
the recitation of an instruction is jury
comprehension.
The
importance
of
jury
comprehension is evident from the text of rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah
R.Crim. P. 19. In addressing the topic of jury
instructions, rule 19 was substantially rewritten in
2001 as part of a comprehensive jury reform
initiative undertaken*317 by this court and the
Utah Judicial Council. The new rule 19 instructs:
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening
statements, the court may instruct the jury
concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order
of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof
for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms.
The court may instruct the jury concerning any
matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by
the court and any matter the court in its discretion
believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the
case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing
and a copy provided to each juror. At the final
pretrial conference or at such other time as the court
directs, a party may file a written request that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
request. The court shall inform the parties of its
action upon a requested instruction prior to

instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the parties
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties waive this requirement,
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may
instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will
assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior
to giving the written instruction, the court shall
advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the
content of the instruction. A party may request an
interim written instruction.
Id at 19(a)-(b) (2003).
K 48 The common objective of these provisions is
jury comprehension. The means chosen to pursue
the end of better jury comprehension is a grant of
expanded flexibility in the content of jury
instructions and the timing of their recitation to the
jury. It is impossible for us to harmonize the
pragmatic tone of rule 19 with a hidebound
interpretation of rule 17, and we decline to do so.
^ 49 The trial judge's decision to forego the
repetition of jury instruction in this case was well
within the bounds of discretion afforded by rule 17
and rule 19. As noted by the court of appeals, less
than twenty-four hours separated the trial court's
reading of the preliminary instructions from the
conclusion of the evidence. In addition, the jury
was provided with a written copy of every
instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the court of
appeals's result on the issue of the trial court's
timing of its recitation of jury instructions, but on
different grounds.

CONCLUSION
% 50 For the reasons detailed herein, we reverse
the court of appeals and reinstate Mr. Reyes's
conviction. We abandon Robertson's insistence
that the jury be instructed that to return a guiltyverdict it must "obviate all reasonable doubts."
We authorize for use in our court the Federal
Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction
21. We also affirm on alternate grounds the court
of appeals's refusal to grant Mr. Reyes relief on his
challenge to the timing of the jury instructions.
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U 51 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
Utah,2005.
State v. Reyes
116 P.3d 305, 527 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2005 UT 33
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Addendum C {Halls)

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

»

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

throughout the trial.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond

a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate ajfreasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy,
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the
case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

J

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those elements

are as follows:
COUNT I:

POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
1.

That on or about March 1, 2004,

2.

Defendant possessed methamphetamine,

3.

Knowing what it was and intending to use it.

COUNT II: POSSESSION OF IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
1.

That on or about March 1, 2004,

2.

Defendant possessed an imitation controlled
substance,

3.

With intent to distribute it.

COUNT III: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
1.

That on or about March 1, 2004,

2.

Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia,

3.

With intent to use it.

If you believe that the state has proved each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
guilty.

If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements

beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty.

Addendum D {Kinne)

-7
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

throughout the trial.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond

a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate aj I reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy,
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the
case.

INSTRUCTION NO,

1

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those elements

are as follows:
COUNT I

BURGLARY OF A DWELLING
1.

That on or about December 9, 2 003,

2.

Defendant entered or remained in a dwelling of
another,

COUNT II:

COUNT III:

3.

Without permission,

4.

With intent to commit a theft.

THEFT OF A FIREARM
1.

That on or about December 9, 2 003,

2.

Defendant exercised unauthorized control,

3.

Of a firearm belonging to another,

4.

With a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE
1.

That on or about January 4, 2 0 04,

2.

Defendant possessed a motor vehicle,

3.

That he knew or had reason to believe had been
stolen.

COUNT IV:

POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
1.

That on or about January 4, 20 04,

2.

Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia,

3.

With intent to use it.

If you believe that the state has proved each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty.

Addendum E (Austin)

INSTRUCTION NO.

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute
certainty.

It is the burden of the State to eliminate all

reasonable doubt.

Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason,

which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt
is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to

satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt.

A

reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain
based upon the evidence in the case.

INSTRUCTION NO

. 3

In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those elements

are as follows:
COUNT I:

MURDER

1.

That on or about May 9, 2 004

2.

Defendant either,
a.

Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
another, or

b.

i.

Intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another,

ii.

Committed an act clearly dangerous to
human life,

iii. That caused the death of another, or
c.

i.

Acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life,

ii.

Engaged in conduct which created a grave
risk of death of another, and

iii. Thereby caused the death of another
COUNT II: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
1.

That on or about May 9, 2 004

2.

Intentionally or knowingly

3.

Used force or fear of immediate

force against

another in the course of committing a theft, and

4.

Either a) used or threatened to use a dangerous
weapon, or (b) took an operable motor vehicle

COUNT III: INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER
1.

That on or about May 9, 2 004,

2.

Knowing that a peace officer was seeking to arrest
or detain him,

3.

Defendant interfered with the arrest or detention
by refusing to perform a lawful order made by a
peace officer involved in the arrest or detention,

If you believe that the state has proved each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty.

